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Editorial 
  IMAGES OF SELF AND OTHERS   
Belonging to and Intertwining in Communities 
According to Wittgenstein, “The aspects of things that are most 
important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and 
familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is 
always before one’s eyes).”1 That human beings are bodily beings 
with non-physical dimensions and that they are not solitary 
individuals but belong to communities are such obvious facts that 
the articles in this issue of the Journal of Dharma reaffirm.  
In the fundamental human quest for personal identity, both the 
philosophical and religious traditions came to the conclusion that 
body is not a sufficient object of self, though we generally identify 
human beings referring to physical features. Though I am bodily, I 
am not my body. If body is not a proper object for self, we feel 
forced to posit an immaterial substance as that which makes a 
being a human being. Though Aristotle, and Aquinas following 
him, argued that the rational soul as the substantial form that 
makes a being a human being, they did not identify human being 
with soul. The self is not merely present in the body, but rather 
very intimately joined so that soul and the body form a composite 
unit, the unity of which is described differently by different 
philosophers.  
According to Wittgenstein, the concepts relating to the physical 
and the spiritual relate to each other in a variety of ways in the 
stream of our life and thought: “The inner is tied up with the outer 
not only empirically, but also logically.”2 It is not just as an 
empirical fact but also a logical fact, that human beings are neither 
bodies nor bodiless selves, but beings with distinctive 
psychophysical characteristics. Our use of “living human being,” as 
                                               
1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. 
Anscombe, trans., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953, 129. 
2Ludwig Wittgenstein, Last Writings on The Philosophy of Psychology, 
Vol. I, (ed) G. H. Von Wright, and Heikki Nyman, (trans.) C. G. Luckhardt 
and Maximilian A. E. Aue, London: Basil Blackwell, 1990, 63. 
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Evans observed, “simply spans the gap between the mental and the 
physical, and is no more intimately connected with one aspect of 
our self-conception than the other.”3 “All the peculiarities we have 
noticed about ‘I’-thoughts are consistent with and, indeed, at points 
encourage, the idea that there is a living human being which those 
thoughts concern.”4  
As we have seen the intimate union of physical and non-
physical aspects of human beings, there are complex forms of 
relations among individuals and communities. Persons are living 
human beings who are substantially present in the world in 
collaboration and conversation with fellow human beings. It is a 
fundamental fact that “we belong to a community;”5 it is not just a 
homely reminder of an empirical fact but an existentially 
fundamental fact of life that is given showing who we are and how 
we live. Belonging to a community does not mean, however, that 
an individual is always surrounded by a group of people; it is 
rather a basic presupposition in our characteristic practices and are 
fundamental to being and becoming human. Individuals and 
communities are not contraries nor do they stand at opposite poles. 
They are related to each other not just empirically but logically. We 
are not just solitary individuals; we are in collaboration and 
conversation with other human beings in an inter-subjective world. 
This is not just something additional and consequent, but 
something constitutive and existential of being human. The world 
is made a human world, rather than a biological environment 
through our co-reflection, conversation and collaboration. As active 
and free agents living in the world, we realise ourselves not in 
seclusion but in a life of conversation and collaboration with fellow 
human beings. Belonging to a community is a fundamental way of 
our being human. 
We fundamentally belong to a community. We live, move 
and have our being in the physical world, in conversation and 
                                               
3Evans, G. The Varieties of Reference, J. McDowell, ed., Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982, 256. 
4Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 256. 
5Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, G. E M. Anscombe and G. H. von 
Wright, eds., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, 298. 
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collaboration with other persons. We are not only the products 
of nature, but also products and projects of nurture. We have an 
existential relation to the society as we are formed by a 
community and form a community. To exist as human is 
therefore to co-exist and to pro-exist.  Others are always present 
in our being and becoming. One could see a number of modes of 
human co-existence: Indifference – Concern, Conflict – 
Unanimity, Exploitation – Promotion, Dependence – Rebellion, 
Justice –Injustice, and Love – Hate.  It is love that makes 
something personal and intersubjective and genuinely human. 
Love transforms I-it relation to I-Thou relationship. Love 
creatively transforms the persons, both the love and the beloved. 
The experience of being together-in-love is expressed in terms of 
fulfilment and completeness. Love directs and energizes the 
process of becoming fully human. It is the relations that define 
and decide our identities - self and others, and these are not 
fixed once for all, but dynamic and flexible. Conceptual 
clarifications on the complex relations between physical and 
spiritual, natural and cultural, and individual and social in these 
images of self and others is important in our efforts to know 
ourselves and to lead meaningful lives. 
The first paper, "The Bright Lights on Self Identity and 
Positive Reciprocity: Spinoza’s Ethics of the Other Focusing on 
Competency, Sustainability and Divine Love" by Ignace Haaz, 
presents the human being in a monistic psycho-dynamical 
affective framework, instead of a dualistic pedestal above 
nature, without naturalising the human being in an eliminative 
materialistic view. Spinoza finds an important entry point in a 
panpsychist and holistic perspective, presenting the complexity 
of the human being, which is not reducible to the psycho-
physiological conditions of life. From a panpsychist holistic 
perspective, qualities and values emerge from the world. 
Human reality, though a social reality, supposes a basis for 
shared competencies, which author presents as grounded on 
the sustaining character of the essence of the animal-man as 
will-to-power. Negatively speaking we all share same asocial 
tendencies and affects. This aspect is not only negative but it is 
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also a will to develop and master the environment, because 
values have an onto-metaphysical immanent dimension in 
nature, not because there is an individual bottom-up will to 
survive, but rather a will to live in harmony with the 
surrounding world. Spinoza understood and described 
perfectly the power of the mind over the power of the affects, 
as a co-constituting dimension, which is alienating natural 
dependencies, leaving an inner space for the objectification of 
ethical values, not related to mere compensation mechanisms. 
The author first presents the proto-ethical conditions for the 
sustainability of life as affective and dynamic grounding into 
the immanent world, and then the realistic principles of an 
ethics of competency and sees how far mutual recognition, as 
the concrete activity of mutually serving each other, has been 
presented in a convincing way by Spinoza. 
A crucial question in a pluralist society is how justice can be 
done to alterity without endangering thereby one’s identity. 
Roger Burggraeve, a leading Levinasian scholar addresses the 
question critically and creatively in his excellent essay, ““When 
in the ‘Brother’ the Stranger is Acknowledged”: From Identity 
to Alterity and Dialogue, According to Emmanuel Levinas.” 
Levinas’ dialogical phenomenology of the same and the other, 
and of responsibility, sets us, according to the author, on the 
track of ‘fraternity’ as human condition. As ethical condition of 
‘solidarity’ this fraternity transcends sex and gender, even if the 
concept is originally rooted in biology. Inspired by Levinas, 
Burggraeve explains how fraternity attains its full sense when, 
in the brother, the stranger is acknowledged (and not the 
opposite: ‘when in the stranger the brother is recognized’). This 
‘ethical fraternity’ makes it possible to realize equality in 
society, and to promote a respectful and authentic inter-
religious, or rather ‘interconvictional’ dialogue. Such an open 
dialogue, the author concludes, appeals to an asymmetric and 
reciprocal mastership and critical learning from each other. 
Don Adams in his creative reading of Levinas and Spinoza 
in "The Self and the Other in Levinas and Spinoza" argues that 
the Spinozan self within the context of his own ethical system, 
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we find that it also ultimately is other-directed, but in a manner 
quite distinct from that of the Levinasian self. Levinas himself, 
however, in his ethics elucidates his key concept of the other-
directed self by opposing it to the wholly self-interested self, as 
he interprets it, in the ethics of Baruch Spinoza. The contrasting 
ethical selves of Levinas and Spinoza provide alternative models 
of existing ethically in the world, both of which are in insistent 
opposition to the modern humanist valorization of the 
autonomous egoistic individual as a valid ontological concept 
and worthwhile ethical ideal. 
Another comparative study is made by Vinoy Thomas 
Paikkattu in his essay, "Knowing Self, Identity, and Otherness: 
An Epistemological Account after Aquinas and Wittgenstein." 
According to the author, discussions on the self, identity, and the 
other take an epistemological turn in Aquinas and Wittgenstein. 
Both of them leave ample space for it notwithstanding their 
ontological and linguistic philosophies, respectively. The 
epistemology that can be drawn from them does not limit itself 
to the ‘process of knowledge’, rather moves beyond the 
synthesis of knowledge to the integration of life and actions. The 
dichotomy between ‘self’ and the ‘other’ and the ‘inner’ and the 
‘outer’ are overcome with the relational epistemology. Systemic 
epistemology is transformed to relational epistemology where 
relationality of knowing, acting, and being constitute a linguistic 
community. Human persons as the members of this community 
play distinct roles in the human world where other beings also 
exist. 
The final article, "The Self: Metaphysical Reality vs 
Communicative Device" by Anil Kumar Tewari creatively 
juxtaposes the non-Buddhist and the Buddhist viewpoints of 
Indian philosophy on the notion of the self in order to see the 
rationality behind their conceptions. To pursue this objective, the 
paper is divided into four sections. The introductory section 
points to various usages of the expression ‘self’ in common 
parlance, which tends to encompass everything that matters to an 
individual. The second section describes various approaches 
adopted by the major systems of Indian philosophy towards the 
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self. It is shown that the conception of the self as a metaphysical 
substance is more amenable to those Indian philosophical systems 
that believe in the plurality of individual selves. The third section 
deals with the Buddhist counter-narrative to the notion of 
substantive metaphysical self. Since the parsimony of the 
Buddhist proposal lies in its metaphysical non-proliferation, the 
linguistic entities such as the self (jīva) or soul (ātman) purportedly 
referring to a substantive entity are declared metaphysically 
vacuous, but the convention of language enables us to pick out 
the intended referent which is nothing but individual person. 
Thus the metaphysical concepts of the non-Buddhist systems of 
Indian philosophy turn out to be a 'communicative device' in 
Buddhism, without any metaphysical bearing.  
Identity of self and others is thus always composite and 
plural, though it is often used as a simple abstraction as if 
identities could be defined like chemical formulae. To borrow 
the analogy of thread by Wittgenstein, “in spinning a thread we 
twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not 
reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole 
length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.”6 With sentiments 
of gratitude to all the collaborators may I have the privilege of 
presenting to the readers this issue of the Journal of Dharma, on 
“Images of Self and Others: Philosophical Investigations.” 
 
Jose Nandhikkara, Editor-in-Chief 
                                               
6Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 167. 
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THE BRIGHT LIGHTS ON SELF IDENTITY 
AND POSITIVE RECIPROCITY 
Spinoza’s Ethics of the Other Focusing on 
Competency, Sustainability and Divine Love 
Ignace Haaz 
Abstract: The claim of this paper is to present Spinoza’s view 
on self-esteem and positive reciprocity, which replaces the 
human being in a monistic psycho-dynamical affective 
framework, instead of a dualistic pedestal above nature. 
Without naturalising the human being in an eliminative 
materialistic view as many recent neuro-scientific conceptions 
of the mind do, Spinoza finds an important entry point in a 
panpsychist and holistic perspective, presenting the complexity 
of the human being, which is not reducible to the psycho-
physiological conditions of life. From a panpsychist point of 
view, qualities and values emerge from the world, in a situation 
similar to what could be seen in animism, or early childhood 
psychology, where the original distance between the mind and 
the exterior thing is reduced ad minima, and both can even 
interrelate in a confusing manner. Human reality is 
nevertheless a social reality, it supposes a basis for shared 
competencies, that we will present as grounded on the one 
hand of the sustaining character of the essence of the animal-
man as will-to-power. Negatively speaking we all share same 
asocial tendencies and affects. This aspect is not only negative 
but it is also a will to develop and master the environment, 
because values have an onto-metaphysical immanent 
dimension in nature, not because there is an individual bottom-
up will to survive, but rather a will to live in harmony with the 
                                               
Dr Ignace Haaz had his Postdoctoral research on the philosophy and 
ethics of punishment (University of Fribourg Switzerland), PhD and 
MA in Philosophy (University of Geneva, Switzerland) in the areas of 
the philosophy of rhetoric and 19th Century philosophy. Since 2012, 
Ignace does project management for Globethics.net Foundation in 
Geneva as Executive Editor and ethics E-Librarian. 
262 Ignace Haaz 
 
Journal of Dharma 43, 3 (July-September 2018) 
surrounding world. On the other hand, we shall see that 
Spinoza understood and described perfectly the power of the 
mind over the power of the affects, as a co-constituting 
dimension, which is alienating natural dependencies, leaving 
an inner space for the objectification of ethical values, not 
related to mere compensation mechanisms. We shall present 
the high standard of Spinoza’s personal values and positive 
reciprocity, related to his crucial understanding of the concept 
of wholeness of life grounded in nature as the strong roots of a 
tree of life, but also the very metaphysical conditions for ethical 
values. The essential capacity of shared social affects is 
completed by a self-overcoming of the animal-man based 
passions, restraining and sometimes harming social or spiritual 
life. We are first going to present these proto-ethical conditions 
for the sustainability of life as affective and dynamic grounding 
into the immanent world, second we shall present realistic 
principles of an ethics of competency and see how far mutual 
recognition, as the concrete activity of mutually serving each 
other, has been presented in a convincing way by Spinoza.  
Keywords: Competency, Philosophical Ethics, Love, Spinoza, 
Sustainability, 17th Century Philosophy. 
1. Introduction 
To introduce a constructive combination between the notions of 
the identity of the self and mutual recognition, we would like to 
present Spinoza’s careful use of the terms “gratitude”, 
“recognition”, “gratefulness”, “thankfulness” in his Ethics. 
There are certainly two good reasons to dig into Spinoza’s 
work on ethics: first we find a presentation of the relation 
between two cardinal ethical values: competency and 
sustainability, in a non-anthropomorphic framework of our 
presence on earth, as englobing whole and godly emanation. 
Second, Spinoza presents the concept of positive reciprocity and 
the sentiment of gratefulness as related to the holistic 
understanding of ethical stewardship, or human being as social 
beings, keen to being in the service of others. A true service is 
intimately grounded in a correct perception of the self and its 
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dependency to the englobing whole. We find in Spinoza’s ethics 
psychophysiological tendencies of the self, and the alienation of 
passions through a realist constitution of values, based on our 
capacity to understand our dependency as living being to the 
wholeness of life. It is not efficient to benefit from someone, as 
when we receive a gift, if the relation between equals is 
undermined for some hidden reasons, which are not 
transparently expressed. If someone may expect a benefit in 
return from a gift, which would semantically not be a gift 
anymore, the result would be the creation of a debt, which 
changes the relationship between equals. Positive reciprocity 
implies something different from the diminishing of the mutual 
equilibrium resulting from the possibility of hidden benefices or 
debts. In order to feel grateful we need to feel that the other has 
served us with the self, and not by imposing strength or any 
unexpected unilateral advantage, that we would owe in return. 
In recognising a service, we connect the experience with the 
totality of our experiences. Limitations serve, errors and wounds 
serve, even ignorance can serve, as the wholeness in us serves 
the wholeness in others and the wholeness in life, what Spinoza 
calls our intimate foundational relation to the Substance or God. 
We find inviting presentations of the value of Spinoza’s 
ethics by important philosophers. We have certainly with 
Spinoza “the purest philosopher”“and the most effective moral 
code in the world” if we follow Nietzsche’s commentary, who 
recommends him, on the ground of the apolitical character of 
what after Spinoza we could call rational moral agents as “free 
spirits.”7 Nietzsche opposes his ethics of a tragic-comic self-
derision and laughter “ten times should you laugh in a day” and 
the Biblical image of the “laughing lion” to Spinoza’s rigorous 
“vivisection of the affects,” a very cautious control of the 
expression of affects, in an ethics of the “laughing-no-more” and 
                                               
7Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Human All too Human: A Book for Free 
Spirits (Ein Buch für freie Geister), VIII, No 475, trans. Marion Faber with 
Stephen Lehmann, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984. See 
also Henning Ottmann, Nietzsche Handbuch, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler 
Verlag, 2000, 102.  
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“weeping-no-more.”8 With Nietzsche we may add: where 
vivisection of the affects would make fully sense, there shouldn’t 
be any “harming of the affects.”9  
E. von Hartmann, another Schopenhauerian philosopher as 
Nietzsche, complements his views on the meaning of affects for 
Spinoza, praising the precision and coherence of Spinoza’s views 
on ethics, but regretting his extreme parsimony with regard to 
the phenomenological description of social affects. For 
Hartmann many of them are reason based principles such as 
political rights and today we would focus on cultural rights; 
others legal rights and ethical principles.10 But a first larger set of 
ethical principles, corresponding to the affective ground 
proposed by Spinoza, should be rather seen as subjective ethical 
principles, as the crucial role of an ethics of compassion, 
including other social moral sentiments. Social affects or 
subjective ethical principles are extremely important for applied 
ethics, because they help grounding the very notion of equality. 
One needs to add that neither Hartmann, nor Nietzsche refutes 
Spinoza’s formalism of the affects, they only observe the 
possibility, on the line developed by Leibniz, Kant and later 
Schopenhauer, to mark the limits of the world of subjective 
experience. In the 20th Century, Max Scheler and Edmund 
Husserl will later develop it as the phenomenological reduction 
of the first person experience. As example, the sentiment of 
repentance, which is an important moral sentiment related to the 
                                               
8“Non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari sed intelligere.” Translation 
by Coleridge: “I sedulously disciplined my mind neither to laugh at, or 
bewail, or detest, the actions of men; but to understand them.” 
Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, vol. 4, (Part I), 166, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1969. Spinoza, Works, Vol. II, Spinoza’s 
Political Treatise, "Introduction," IV, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, 
Princeton: University Press, 505. 
9Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufmann, 
New York: Random House, No 198, 1966, 108. 
10Eduard von Hartmann, Die Gefühlsmoral, ed., J.C. Wolf, 
“Moralprinzip des Geselligkeitstriebe,” Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 
1879/2006: 53, 59, 83. 
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experience of an inappropriate choice that could lead to 
wrongful consequences, is understood differently depending on 
whether we place the experience of the subject in the centre of 
the picture or not.  
Should repentance be considered as useful after a 
wrongdoing, considering that an amelioration and reconciliation 
is plausible based on the suffering related to the impossibility of 
undoing a wrong? Spinoza doubts the fundamental religious 
power of repentance, on the ground of his deterministic 
conception of our natural comprehension, contrary to 
Hartmann’s Christian emphasis on the importance of the process 
of free decision making, and of the careful distinguishing 
between natural inclination for repentance on one hand and 
ethical principle of repentance on the other. Spinoza delivers 
powerful argument for prevailing against received authority, 
and yet, the starting proposition of his ethics, regarding the 
relation of the human being to God is fundamental:  
E1P15: Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be 
conceived without God. Dem.: Except for God, there neither 
is, nor can be conceived, any substance (by P14), i.e. (by D3), 
thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But 
modes (by D5) can neither be nor be conceived [30] without 
substance. So they can be in the divine nature alone, and can 
be conceived through it alone.  
E2P10: The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of 
man, or substance does not constitute the form of man. [30] Dem.: 
For the being of substance involves necessary existence (by 
E1P7). Therefore, if the being of substance pertained to the 
essence of man, then substance being given, man would 
necessarily be given (by [II/93] D2), and consequently man 
would exist necessarily, which (by A1) is absurd, q.e.d. 
Schol.: This proposition is also demonstrated from E1P5, viz. 
that [5] there are not two substances of the same nature. Since 
a number of men can exist, what constitutes the form of man 
is not the being of substance. Further, this proposition is 
evident from the other properties of substance, viz. that 
substance is, by its nature, infinite, immutable, [10] 
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indivisible, etc., as anyone can easily see. Cor.: From this it 
follows that the essence of man is constituted by certain 
modifications of God’s attributes.11 
For (by E2P10) the being of substance does not belong to the 
essence of human being. That essence therefore (by E1P15) is 
something which is in God, and which without God can neither 
be nor be conceived. Spinoza gives some examples concerning 
the method of exposition he uses. 
In order to start thinking ethics as a system, one needs to bear 
in mind some basic principles, such as thinking particular 
essences. The essence of spatiality is the exteriority of its parts, 
the essence of human being is to be a reasonable animal (or 
social, etc.) and then philosophers get confused because they 
then ask whether these essences are related to a first principle or 
independent to any first principle. Spinoza explains why these 
[mainly Cartesian] philosophers get puzzled when it comes to 
initial thinking about ethics: 
[30] The cause of this, I believe, was that they did not observe 
the [proper] order of Philosophizing. For they believed that 
the divine nature, which they should have contemplated 
before all else (because it is prior both in knowledge and in 
nature) is last in the order of knowledge, and that the things 
that are called objects of the senses are prior [35] to all. That is 
why, when they contemplated natural things, they thought of 
nothing less than they did of the divine nature; and when 
afterwards [II/94] they directed their minds to contemplating 
                                               
11Curley’s translation from Works vol. 1 Ethics is used but 
abbreviations are adapted as follow: parts of Spinoza's Ethics are 
referred to as: P(roposition), Sc.(holium), D(efinition) and the five parts 
of the Ethics are cited by Arabic numerals: thus E3P1 stands for the 
first proposition of the third part of the Ethics. The Collected Works of 
Spinoza, Ed. and translated by Edwin Curley, Princeton: UP. 
1985/2016, 2nd printing. Spinoza uses the expression of “the Man” in 
conformity with 17th Century language, but at least in his Ethics, the 
Man stands for the generic term of the human being. Each man and 
woman should be able to reach the intellectual love of God and nature, 
or supreme goal, from a path of deepening of their being. 
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the divine nature, they could think of nothing less than of 
their first fictions, on which they had built the knowledge of 
natural things, because these could not assist knowledge of 
the divine nature. So it is no wonder that they have generally 
contradicted themselves (E2P10 Cor. Note). 
Ethics starts by God or the divine, but it is also a purification 
of the understanding, meditation on the experience of joy as an 
experience of the perfect character of love as related to 
competency, by opposition to weakness, which leads to 
corruption and evil.12  
(E3P11Sc.: We see, then, that the Mind can undergo great 
changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser 
perfection. These passions, [II/149] indeed, explain to us the 
affects of Joy and Sadness. By Joy, therefore, I shall 
understand in what follows that passion by which the Mind 
passes to a greater perfection. 
Practically, we do not need to worry about the metaphysical 
beginnings of ethics in God, to find in the third and fourth books 
of the Ethics most of the passions related to reciprocal 
recognition. Recognition is partly shared esteem but not 
necessarily dependent on others, it is “to imagine [oneself] to be 
praised by others” (E4P53), and passing from lesser to greater 
perfection, by “imagining” and “encouraging” its “power of 
acting”. In order to stay in this solitary and solipsist circle of 
generating joy for the self, one consequently needs to prevent the 
opposite: i.e., any sudden lack of positive identification. 
Saddening the imagination or limiting the self in such a way as 
to encourage oneself to imagine being blamed by others is the 
opposite of self-esteem: 
(E3D26) Exp.: Self-esteem is opposed to humility, insofar as 
we understand by it a Joy born of the fact that we consider 
our power of acting. But insofar as we also understand by it a 
Joy, accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe 
                                               
12Gordon Clement Wickersham, Spinoza's Concept of God's Infinity, 
MA Thesis, Boston University, 1951, 97, see also: 77-81, 
<https://www.globethics.net/gel/6506745> (3 May 2018). 
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we have done from a free decision of the [5] Mind, it is 
opposed to Repentance. 
Negative self-esteem is related to humility, which “exists 
when someone knows his own imperfections, without regard to 
[others’] disdain of him.” Humility is similar to “despondency” 
(E4P57), as far as both are the opposite of “pride: when someone 
attributes to himself a perfection that is not to be found in 
him.”13 And they both “are born of humility”(E3D29), but 
despondency is “Sadness born of a man’s false opinion that he is 
below others.” Since the nature of man rooted in his capacity to 
produce himself completely, “humility and despondency are 
very rare,” “human nature, considered in itself, strains against 
them, as far as it can” (E3D29): 
So Humility, or the Sadness which arises from the fact that a 
man reflects on his own lack of power, does not arise from a 
true reflection, or reason, and is a passion, not a virtue q.e.d. 
[II/250] E3P54: Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise 
from reason, instead, he who repents what he has done is 
twice wretched or lacking power”(E3P55, S.P.B, n 58).  
Humility, like repentance, remorse, etc. are depressing passions, 
which only tend to annihilate us. Overall, human being’s lack of 
power to moderate and restrain the affects is called “bondage” 
by Spinoza, who describes in the fourth part of the Ethics, “how 
man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of [10] 
himself, but of fortune” (E4 Preface). 
It is slightly better to be content than sad: “A desire that 
arises from Joy is stronger, other things equal, than one that 
arises from Sadness” (E4P18); but “overestimation is thinking 
more highly of someone than is just, out of Love.” It differs from 
“scorn [which] is thinking less highly of someone than is just, 
out of Hate” (E3D21-22). But, “it happens that everyone is 
anxious to tell his own deeds, and show off his powers, both of 
body [5] and of mind—and that men, for this reason, are 
troublesome to one another”(E3P55, Sc.). We see that envy is 
                                               
13Spinoza, Collected Works, vol. 1, Short Treatise on God, Man and His 
Well-Being, Ch. VIII, "On Esteem and Disdain."  
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intoxicating mutual recognition. Human beings are by nature 
envious or “glad of their equals’ weakness and saddened by 
their equals’ virtue” (E3P55, Sc.). Envy shows an important 
aspect of all passions: they are diversity by excellence of the 
nature of sentiments and the fluctuation of desires, in narrow 
and wide forms. The depression of the desire is melancholy its 
exaltation revives us.14 Vices such as envy show the affected 
nature of the man as “mode” for Spinoza, in conformity with the 
idea that all modes, including the human being, are finite and 
limited expressions of the substance in the nature, except the 
substance or causa sui. A failure or incapacity to realize a 
competency is failure of the expression of the human being, 
conceived as a capacity to develop expansive power. In nature, 
limited modes are stable and express always the same thing; 
human being, in comparison has a power of development that 
has much more elasticity, regeneration, elevation and 
amplification. 
For Spinoza our identity is grounded on a universal 
egoistical anthropological assumption common in XVII century 
(as with Hobbes), also called a “possessive individualism.” By 
contrast to hedonism, it has not pleasure as an aim but the 
affirmation and expansion of the individual self: l’amour propre, 
which arises with the planning and calculation of the future will 
to power. Spinoza focuses on the desire, not to realize a 
transcendent value, but as sustainability of the individual in the 
existence and the accumulation of power on the world or 
conatus. But for Spinoza self-sustainability is not the assimilation 
with an instinct of conservation (as Hobbes derives it from vital 
and animal movement), it has to do with living in suo esse, in 
one’s being or essence, hence through the objectivation of values 
in a genealogical process related to passions.15 Opposed to the 
                                               
14Louis Millet, Pour Connaître la pensée de Spinoza, Paris: Bordas, 
1970, 83. 
15“Objectivation of values" is a proposition used by Matheron to 
describe a situation where we cannot control objects that we seek to 
value but only evaluations for Spinoza. On the one side, the self is 
losing his ipseity, his wholeness of sensible being by being rational but 
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Hobbesian biological anthropology, which does not lead to an 
objective representation of values, the genealogical definition of 
passions of Spinoza leads to a theory of the alienation of 
passions in an identification process which does. Passions have 
to do with a simple identification: we are glad to witness the 
conservation of an object, which we love, and grieve its loss.  
Against the Cartesian dogma that the self should be 
identified with the mind Spinoza (and later Schopenhauerian 
philosophy) will ground the presupposition that the self is 
embodied and that its integration into reality at large is thus 
made possible. By contrast to Spinoza, later propositions as the 
phenomenological analysis proposed by Hartmann shows that it 
may not be possible to ask only to the rational faculty to make 
good choice; Hartmann thinks that moral sentiments and the 
ethical principle of taste, which are only conceived negatively by 
Spinoza, have a proactive role to play in helping the man to 
constitute higher and higher ethical values.16 
2. Gratitude as Love Based on Shared Competencies vs 
Integrity 
In his important study, Matheron gives some additional 
indications on the logic of mutual recognition in Spinoza’s Ethics 
that could be called egoistic. The key argument of Spinoza is that 
instead of autonomous choice based morals, we should 
concentrate on the knowledge of the virtues and their causes, 
and observation of rules, practice them, and direct most actions 
                                               
on the other side the objective representation of values for Spinoza 
offers a firm grip on the sway that external objects and the passions 
exercise over our existence. Finally the wholeness of the self is 
experienced in seeking the deepest treasures of the human mind. 
Spinoza invites us to an itinerarium mentis in Deo, a perfectionist 
knowledge path, which is at the same time an intellectual love of God. 
16E. v. Hartmann, Die Gefühlsmoral, ed., J.C. Wolf, op. cit. 53, 59, 83. 
Read also further on similarities between Schopenhauer and Spinoza: 
Jenny Bunker, Schopenhauer's Spinozism, Thesis, University of 
Southampton, 2015, Sections on “Ethics,” 99, and “Salvation,” 143. 
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according to the command of reason.17 What is Spinoza’s 
understanding of mutual recognition or gratitude? 
If there is a maxim for Spinoza as a rule of praxis it would be: 
“Hate is to be conquered by Love, or Nobility, not by repaying it 
with Hate in return” (E5P6), as presented in the fifth part of the 
Ethics “On the power of the intellect, or the human freedom.” 
Inter-human relations can be assured by a system of obligation 
to give (E3P36), to take (E4P70), and to give back (E3P42). 
Gratitude tends to minimize in this process the joy that we first 
get from the surprise of receiving since the experience of the past 
service allows us to imagine better the future comportment of 
our partners and related benefits. From the point of view of 
Spinoza’s definition of love, I necessarily love the merchant that 
gives me the object of my desire. This purely trade related 
sentiment of love is an interesting positive ethical optic and 
shows the valorization of trade.18 In the economic sector of trade 
each individual feels the interdependence and convergence of 
interests, each being in solidarity with all. Individual prosperity 
is depending on the prosperity of all with whom the trader is in 
professional relation: retailers, distributors, clients, funding 
partners, etc. But it is at this stage a pure commercial interaction: 
“The thankfulness which men are led by blind Desire to [II/264] 
display toward one another is for the most part a business 
transaction or an entrapment, rather than thankfulness” 
(E4P71Sc.). 
As we see in the economic understanding of gratitude as 
interplay of desires to possess and desires to give and sell objects 
of desires, human trade based interactions tend to develop a 
strong solidarity of interdependencies and converging interests, 
but with some limitations regarding gratitude. How does the 
                                               
17Alexandre Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza, Paris : 
Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969/1988, 86, 204-5 ; C. B. Macpherson, The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1962. 
18Spinoza shows also that the more the predictability of this mutual 
recognition is given as in trade the more likely it is to find ignorance 
and the absence of free spirits (See E4P71).  
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immanent-realist constitution of value arise from this dense 
tissue of human transactions and expectations? Many gifts 
should not be accepted. On the contrary, “firmness of mind” is 
demonstrated by “who does not allow any gifts to corrupt him, 
to his or to the general ruin” (shared disgrace, lat.: communem 
perniciem). There is often a moment when the desire for glory 
intercedes on that of love, when Y doesn’t feel obliged to X to 
pay his dues, to refer to a register of duties, to adhere to 
prevailing collective policies. 
Commerce is of wildfowl (Mercatura, seu aucupium), not that 
corruption belongs to the essence of trading, but all trading 
without clear policies and sanctions turns quickly to conflicts of 
interest and abuses. When X acknowledges the ingratitude of Y: 
“He who has benefited someone—whether moved to do so by 
Love or by the hope of Esteem—will be saddened if he sees his 
benefit accepted in an ungrateful spirit” (E3P42). We fall back to 
negative reciprocity as finely analysed by Matheron,19 but X and 
Y do not forget all of a sudden the advantages resulting from 
their previous interactions, they stay for a while in a mixed 
feeling between love and hatred. “So from imagining himself to 
be hated by someone, he will be affected with Sadness, 
accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him [as a cause of 
the sadness] or (by the same Scholium) he will hate the [15] 
other, q.e.d.”(E3P40). “Given a just cause for this hatred, he will 
be affected by Shame (by P30).” “But (by hypothesis), he 
nevertheless loves him. So he will be tormented by Love and 
Hate together” (E3P40Sc.). 
It is the principal aim of political ethics to stabilize the 
process in minimizing the fluctuations of affects, to create rules 
in order to sustain positive reciprocity. Contrary to Kantian 
future propositions, Spinoza does not use the virtue of integrity, 
which depends on practical imperatives based on a subjective 
free choice, in contradiction with his affirmation of absolute 
determinism. As indicative ethics, stabilization of affects has 
nothing to do with morals, since good and bad are all necessary 
                                               
19Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza, 206. 
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manifestations of God’s providence, and wrongdoing should not 
be considered blameworthy but subject of disdain (contemptus, 
versmading). Contrary to Hobbes: “those things which we neither 
desire nor hate we said to contemn,” Spinoza follows Descartes’ 
usage, as Edwin Curley shows well, “contemptus represents 
mépris” as opposed to estime, and is defined as an inclination to 
consider the baseness or smallness of what is mépris. So 
something closer to disesteem seems preferable."20 Spinoza 
prefers such virtues as honesty, trust, reliability and faithfulness 
to describe the positive interplay of shared competencies (lat. 
fides, fidelis, fidus). 
Gratitude is a tricky social virtue: how to deal with 
unexpected and sudden invitations, or with servile attitude such 
as loyalty in student-teacher interactions, or decisions on 
voluntary basis between church members and a church minister 
based on off-record expectations (where the intentions are not 
explicitly stated), or marks of employee-director deference. In 
some cases, familial language can treat individuals as social 
equals, although individuals may have several defined social 
responsibilities and limited freedom to accept new cooperation. 
In various situations where conflicts of interest are often a 
possible issue, socially constructed self-images of the individuals 
interact in conflicting and potentially contradictory ways. Part of 
the ambiguity is specifically on the language or the form of 
communication. We can also feel gratitude for God, as when we 
pray and thank God for living a good life. 
On the one hand, on the subjective side of the moral 
sentiments, gratitude and mutual recognition have to do with 
the expression of love, solidarity and brotherhood. But the 
difficulty with love is that it is not only a subjective attitude, but 
a moral sentiment based ethical principle. As principle of 
religious unity of the highest metaphysical harmony and 
                                               
20Disdain, Glossary-Index, English-Latin-Dutch, The Collected Works 
of Spinoza, Ed. and translated by Edwin Curley, Vol. 1, Princeton: UP. 
1985/2016, 2nd printing. Hobbes’ quotation is from Thomas Hobbes  
Leviathan, Part I, Ch. 6, London: Penguin Classics, 1651, fourth ed. with 
Introduction by C. B. MacPherson, 1985, 120. 
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perfection of the creation, love is an objective telos of all living 
beings, directed to an eternal temporality, distinguished from 
what is sustaining in time, as we find it for example in both 
Spinoza’s subjective and metaphysical Ethics. 
As Kuno Fisher shows it well, Spinoza’s rationalism does not 
suppose a process of development; it does not focus on the 
method of knowledge of the world and on the phenomenal 
conditions of experience of the values. Although Spinoza doesn’t 
contradict such views found after Kant’s Copernican redefinition 
of the early modern cogito in particular with Schopenhauer’s 
Neo-Kantian adaptation of the Spinozian immanent world, 
Spinoza’s early modern formalism should be understood as the 
affirmation that all being is given by God or Nature. The later 
description of the subjective space and time as an essential 
structure of the experience, attached to an intersubjective 
component, will complement the rather minimalistic framework 
of the constitution of the human world within Spinoza’s work.21  
2.1 Spinoza’s High Standard of Personal Values 
We know from the biographers that Spinoza was living in La 
Haye from 1670 to 1677.22 In a letter of 16th February 1673 from 
Louis Fabritius, Professor at the Academy of Heidelberg, 
Spinoza was invited to the post of Ordinary Professor at the 
Academy of La Haye on the behalf of the Elector of Palatine, 
where he could carry on his research in philosophy, without any 
particular constraint other than teaching a few hours to young 
students in philosophy.23 Spinoza would receive the salary of 
any Professor, in similar situation. Surprisingly, Spinoza politely 
                                               
21Fisher Kuno, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Immanuel Kant und 
seine Lehre, Spinozas Monismus, Bd. IV, 1. Theil, Heidelberg: C. 
Winter, 1898, 25. 
22Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, His Well-Being, Transl. and 
ed. A. Wolf, London: A. C. Black, 1910, lxxxi. 
23Correspondence, XLVII, Fabritius to Spinoza, 16th February 1673, 
XLVIII, The answer of Spinoza to Fabritius, the 30th March 1873. 
Spinoza, Oeuvres Complètes, transl. R. Caillois, M. Francès, R. Misrahi, 
NRF Pléiade, 1954, 1283-84. 
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refused the offer, arguing that he would have to renounce partly 
his research in order to teach, also mentioning that he never had 
any desire to accept the responsibility of a university professor.  
As Kuno Fischer shows well, Spinoza was subject of much 
criticism particularly after his political work on the freedom of 
thinking and expression, and before the posthumous edition of 
Ethics in 1677. Spinoza’s adaptation of the Cartesian methodic 
sceptical reduction to religious matters, in particular revelation 
and prophetical insights, has been much commented upon since 
Popkin’s work.24 The philosophy of personal identity has been 
building personal identity on the top of the psycho-dynamic and 
affect oriented natural understanding of the psyche. A key 
aspect of the question how a philosopher understands social 
ethics is related to the kind of philosophy of history he/she 
places in the background of this interrogation. Seventeenth 
century philosophers are used to grounding human capacities 
on God or Nature, therefore the question of the nature of God is 
an important foundational block of how the historical 
development of ethical values are constructed. With Cartesian 
philosophy in general there are Stoic, Epicurean and Christian 
philosophical elements presupposed concerning ethics, 
philosophy of history and religion. With Spinoza in particular, 
anthropological aspects of God (theism) are mixed with non-
anthropological aspects (deism).  
Instead of “standing as judge over us,” which can have only 
“deleterious effects on human freedom and activity, insofar as it 
                                               
24Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to 
Spinoza, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Hobbes and to 
some extend Spinoza are accused of not recognizing the distinction 
between "moral motives" and "physical efficients", the latter being 
derived from self-motion, while the former from a motive related to 
the activity of the understanding. See Samuel Clarke (1738/2005): A 
Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, Prop. X, “Of the 
Necessity of the Will's being determined by the last Judgment of the 
Understanding” Elibron Classics Replica, London: John and Paul 
Knapton, 99. Short Treatise, “On the Immortality of the Soul,” Ch. 
XXIII; “On God and the Creation as Nature” Ch. VIII and IX. 
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fosters a life enslaved to hope and fear and the superstitions to 
which such emotions give rise,” Spinoza is placing all social 
ethics on the healthy ground of a philosophical faith. Of course 
this deep tendency of his work, which gave him the reputation 
of being an early modern sceptic and materialist philosopher, 
was not without consequences for his life. As early as July 27 
1656, Spinoza was issued a harsh ban or excommunication 
pronounced by the Sephardic community of Amsterdam, for 
unclear reasons.25 Leaving a comfortable professional situation 
in the family business and the security of his religious 
community, Spinoza’s main intention is to come back to the 
radical principles philosophy.  
2.2. Ethics of Sustainability: An Immanent Onto-Metaphysical 
Foundation 
Spinoza shows his deep understanding of sustaining values that 
are not only related to ethics, but part of a coherent system 
explaining the metaphysical hierarchy between what exists 
necessarily, by its proper nature “whereby the essence envelops 
the existence,” and the being for which “essence envelops only a 
possible existence.” This is later divided into “substance” and 
“mode,” as for example, movement is the mode of the body, 
having a real being without which we cannot conceive a body, 
but not of the triangle to which movement is only an accident, as 
Spinoza famously demonstrates. It is from this metaphysical 
abstract structure that Spinoza derives further relations between 
what has eternal temporality, distinguished from what is 
sustaining in time: The existence and the sustaining character of 
                                               
25Coherent with Spinoza’s definition of the nature or God (but not 
its attributes or modes), divine providence means only the second 
essential attribute of God, after being causa sui (and as perfect being 
cause of all things): God is the self-sustaining character of all being, as 
“universal providence” the self-sustaining of all things, as part of the 
whole nature. The third attribute being the predestination of God, who 
cannot avoid doing what he is doing, having created all things so 
perfect that he cannot amend them and do them better. Cf. also: 
Nadler, Steven (2001): Spinoza: a Life, Cambridge: University Press, xi.  
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objects are only “a distinction of reason,” meaning not 
metaphysically distinct, but distinct as a mode of thinking that 
serves to recollect, to explain or imagine things that have been 
understood.26  
From religious and metaphysical point of view the mind 
being related not only to the body, which is the “foundation of 
our love” but also “to God who is inalterable, and thus remains 
inalterable,” it would be more precise to call Spinoza’s view 
panpsychist or pantheist rather than materialist (a kind of early 
non-reductive materialism), with two attributes of the material 
world, and the spiritual and metaphysical world. God being the 
infinite, necessarily existing (that is, uncaused), unique 
substance of the universe, there is only one substance in the 
universe; it is God; and everything else that is, is in God. On the 
one hand the natura naturata understood by Spinoza as 
“movement in the matter” or “the sciences of nature” and on the 
other hand there is an understanding as thinking reality, but not 
as two different “substances.” There is only one substance, a 
being that does not need anything other than his sole existence, 
God, or Spinoza’s natura naturans. This is the key argument to 
ground sustainability on a divine love. With the project of his 
Ethics, what Spinoza intends to demonstrate (in the strongest 
sense of that word) is the truth about God, nature and especially 
ourselves. 
3. Spinoza’s Realistic Principle of an Ethics of Competency and 
Sustainability: Reflecting on the Real Formal Causes  
The most central notion of Spinoza’s ethics regarding 
sustainability is the conatus understood not simply as a survival 
instinct with Hobbes but as the fundamental drive of any being, 
on a perfectionist path of empowerment. Other regarding 
attitudes such as love and care are derived from it, but since we 
focus on the pole of the ego, we need to explain socio-cognitive 
decentration, social virtues and generally speaking, altruistic 
                                               
26“Appendices Containing the Metaphysical Thoughts,” Part I, Ch. 
I. “On the Real Being, the Being of Fiction and the Being of Reason.” In 
French: Spinoza, Oeuvres Complètes, op. cit. 301.  
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attitudes. First Spinoza presents dispositions related to love such 
as gratitude, defined as mutual love, as presupposing a rational 
attitude grounded on the wholeness of life. Gratitude is 
appropriately expressed for Spinoza when a person is benefiting 
a service of someone being in the service of life, by opposition of 
helping in such a way that the one who helps feels the greatest 
satisfaction. A person who receives a service should not consider 
that something has been fixed, as a person should not be 
perceived as broken, but a person should keep the sense of 
worth, and gratitude related to the process of heeling has been 
described by Remen as “integrative medicine”. Integrative 
philosophical medicine is a path first explored by Spinoza’s 
exigent view of gratitude and positive reciprocity. When Spinoza 
asks for “a just cause for the love” the philosopher has in mind 
similar situations when a person would falsely believe he/she is 
loved by another, because no cause for the love has been given. 
We could imagine that by helping a person “may inadvertently 
take away” from others more than he/she could ever give them, 
diminishing their self-esteem, their sense of worth.27 The 
objectification of the desire to fix an issue passes by the 
awareness of being used in the service of something greater than 
a simple desire of overcoming an obstacle. The objectification of 
the desire to help into a caring for others implies serving the 
dimension of the wholeness of life.  
Of course, one could imagine loving someone in return 
without a reflective attitude on the causes of love, as 
consequence of the fact that human body can move and dispose 
a great number of external bodies in a multitude of ways (as 
outlined in E2Post.6, E2P16). But to ground mutual recognition 
or gratefulness, human beings are looking for good reasons, or a 
subjective-objective constitutional ground, not only for 
psychologically agreeable sentiments. One could answer love by 
loving on the basis of a reflex as the child, but in order to answer 
gratitude we need an additional causal condition that needs 
clarification: 
                                               
27Rachel Naomi Remen, Kitchen Table Wisdom, New York: Riverhead 
Books, 1996. <http://www.rachelremen.com/ 
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[15] P41: If someone imagines that someone loves him, and 
does not believe he has given any cause for this, he will love 
[that person] in return. [20] Dem.: This Proposition is 
demonstrated in the same way as the preceding one. See also 
its scholium. Schol.: But if he believes that he has given just 
cause for this Love, he will exult at being esteemed (by P30 
and P30S). This, indeed, [25] happens rather frequently (by 
P25) and is the opposite of what we said happens when 
someone imagines that someone hates him (see P40S). Next, 
this reciprocal Love, and consequent (by P39) striving to 
benefit one who loves us, and strives (by the same P39) to 
benefit us, is called Thankfulness, [30] or Gratitude (E3P41). 
Ethical resistance against unjustified gratitude is one thing: 
we already gave some examples of conflicting affects occurring 
in this situation. But could we really think ourselves as free from 
desires if the goal of removing desire is itself a desire among 
many appetites which need to be concretely satisfied? We have 
desires of fulfilment and blessedness, understood as essential 
components of leaving a good life, just to name some important 
desires. We can easily think about a point in our existence that 
lacks a complete development and that generates a degree of 
suffering and frustration, regarding these important goals, and 
therefore needing a religious or philosophical consolation/ 
purification of the spirit with Spinoza.  
Competency is therefore part of what grounds sustainability: 
that is a reflection on what is subject of change in the world and 
the proposed idea of a temporality that could be seen as not 
transient, not subject of becoming other than what he/she is. In 
Spinoza’s vocabulary mode (Modus, wijz) is the unsustainable 
property of things, as opposed to attributum, which designates 
essential, enduring properties of things. Modus is usually not 
used in the trivial sense of way or manner. 
Spinoza introduces a principle of identity in a Godly being 
and says we should love others for the sake of God only, in his 
earliest work, Short Treatise: 
For whenever we do not love that object which alone is 
worthy of being loved, i.e. (as we have already said), God, 
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but love those things which through their own kind and 
nature are corruptible, there follow necessarily from that 
hate, sadness, etc., according to the changes in the object 
loved [30] (because the object is subject to many accidents, 
indeed to destruction itself). Hate: when someone takes the 
thing he loves away from him. Sadness: when he loses it. 
Love of Esteem: when he depends on love of himself. Favor 
and Gratitude: when he does not love his fellow man for the 
sake of God.28 
Spinoza shows in the first part of his Descartes’ Principles of 
Philosophy Demonstrated in the Geometric Manner how the notion 
of “necessary existence” is contained “in the concept of God” (Axiom 
VI), which is a sovereignly perfect being, existence being only 
“possible, in the concept of a limited thing”29. We discover a discrete 
sign of the heritage of Cartesian dualism in Spinoza’s early 
reflections on ethics in the Treatise on the Emendation of the 
Intellect (1677), where Spinoza is juggling with two different 
perspectives at the same time: the notion of a naturally perfect 
being on his own, and the elimination of ideas that are coming 
from an external source, considered as contrary to this inner 
perfection. Spinoza understood by the philosophical aim of “a 
purification of the intellect” this dualistic early of point of view. 
But logically, in order to be purified, intellect cannot at the same 
time be both inherently pure and needing purification30. This 
methodological contradiction will be reassessed and resolved in 
a complete whole in Spinoza’s monumental but posthumous 
Ethics. 
                                               
28Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, Part. II, Ch. XIV.  
29A6, Axioms Taken from Descartes, Descartes’ Principles of 
Philosophy Demonstrated in the Geometric Manner, in: Spinoza, 
Collected Works, vol. 1.  
30The translation of Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect is 
disputed for being too literal and close to the Latin: Tractatus de 
Intellectus Emendatione, when Purification of the Intellect is closer to the 
intention of the author, adopting a proposition closer to the Dutch 
Handeling van de Verbetering van’t Verstant. This text is the first of the 
section Earliest Works of Spinoza, Collected Works, vol. 1. 
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3.1 The Monistic Notion of Identity Related Mutual 
Recognition vs the Transformative Model 
The Commentary on the Short Treatise shows that Spinoza here 
opposes the view of Descartes, who (De Pass. An. III. 194) 
considered gratitude “always virtuous as one of the chief bonds 
of human society.”31 It is only if we start to think more widely 
and develop the subjective level of embeddedness of the self, 
after Descartes with Kant and Schopenhauer, in a transcendental 
and empirical framework (also called later the phenomenal 
world), that we find transformative models of ethical values. 
Instead of the rationalistic realism of Spinoza, we can further 
think of Hegelian and Schopenhauerian terms the transformative 
process underlining the cultural, communicational and social 
ethical level of subjectively constructed interactions, adding 
metaphysical flesh to the formal bones of Spinoza’s ethical 
system. 
 E. von Hartmann’s key work on the phenomenology of the 
ethical consciousness (Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins, 
1879) shows an elegant understanding of how ethics could be 
further adapted as transformative, i.e., based on a historical 
process in development, without needing to go beyond the very 
notion of metaphysical identity as Spinoza grounded it.32 As 
shown by the Berliner philosopher it would not be necessarily to 
change the monistic description of a hierarchy of values (called 
axiology), but only to think more in detail the characteristics of 
the self-sustaining nature of the being, through a dialectical, 
evolutional, transformative framework. If Spinoza introduces 
self-fulfilment within determinism, as Bunker shows well, 
transcendental metaphysic is necessary to introduce an ethics of 
                                               
31Commentary, 218-19. René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, 
transl. S. Voss, section 193 "Gratitude," Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1649/1989. 
32E. v. Hartmann, Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins. 
Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Ethik, Berlin: Carl Duncker’s Verlag, 
1879, 871pp. Cf. first part of our Solidarité chez Hegel, von Hartmann, 
Tocqueville et Mill, 2012, Paris: L’Harmattan, 11-190, where we apply 
this sort of monistic ethics to the philosophy of criminal law. 
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compassion, which is also a pluralistic model of motivation 
opening to alterity, multiplicity and transformative change.33 
Arbib shows finally that Spinoza could be reconciled with the 
philosophy of alterity Levinas, both having proposed an ethics: 
“Spinoza as the fulfilment of the essence by the love of the 
substance, Levinas as the assignment to our neighbour as the 
first philosophy."34 
3.2 Enlargement of Spinoza’s Realistic Reciprocal Interactions: 
the Politeness Theory 
In order to develop positive reciprocal interaction, as not only 
affectively grounded on desire but also on a refined 
psychological typology of what has been called politeness 
attitudes, we could take into consideration two symmetrical 
groups of attitudes, the first based on love as positive politeness, 
and the second on the mixed emotions, where love and hate are 
both part of the overall Stimmung of a mixed reciprocal 
interaction, in negative politeness. Positive Politeness would entail 
such attitudes as noticing, attending to the other, exaggerate 
(interest, approval), use in-group markers, avoid disagreement, 
assert common good, presuppose knowledge of the other, offer, 
optimism, reciprocal inclusion, assume reciprocity, and 
cooperation emphasis through gifts. On the contrary, Negative 
Politeness would entail being conventionally indirect, to 
question, be pessimistic, minimize the face threatening 
impositions, give deference, apologize, impersonalize the self 
and the other, nominalize, and refer to on-record as incurring 
debt of the other.35 Spinoza’s reference to the debt as part of the 
                                               
33Bunker, Schopenhauer's Spinozism, 17, 114. 
34Dan Arbib, "Les deux voies de Spinoza: l’interprétation levinassienne 
de l’Éthique et du Traité théologico-politique," Revue de l’histoire des 
religions, 2 (2012), 275 [our translation]. 
35We borrow the typology to Brown, Penelope and Stephen C. 
Levinson, Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage: Cambridge: 
University Press, 1987, 61, 101, 129, 210. This list of negative and 
positive politeness linguistic markers can be found in a very clear 
transposition of the politeness theory in Edward J. Bridge, "The ‘Slave’ 
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negative reciprocal degradation of trust and love echoes such set 
of attitudes very well. 
4. Conclusion 
Spinoza could be seen as outdated as some contemporary critical 
minds might think, because: “a systematic, comprehensive, even 
consoling view of the world, and of our place in it, has come to 
seem either too ambitious or just impossible."36 It is true that the 
ultimate attempts for systematic great groundings in philosophy 
are to be found in 17th Century works (as in v. Hartmann’s, 
Husserl’s work). We would nevertheless disagree on the idea 
that because great systems are implausible, that calm and 
systematic thinking is not increasing our understanding of 
ourselves and the world in which we live, and therefore are not 
at the very centre of the aim of education and research.  
Knowledge is based on normative optimism that things 
around us in the world should be transformed to some extent, 
and human progress is desirable. Spinoza invites us to operate a 
qualified pessimistic view according to which, life is worth 
living, even though it involves overcoming many of our 
passions. Because we recognise egoism and distrust in the world, 
even among the wisest philosophers, we have therefore strong 
motives to build trust, and require assistance from the 
community. What does overcoming of passions mean? There 
should be first a “vivisection of the affects”, a realistic 
recognition that we are often “driven about in many ways by 
external causes”, in ways contrary to our ethical values. Reason 
for that is that we cannot acquire absolute mastery over all our 
passions. Consequently for Spinoza, the most central principle of 
education and research which should start by identifying the 
immanent, bodily incorporated, socially constructed and 
environmentally contextualized conditions of what Spinoza calls 
                                               
Is the ‘Master’: Jacob’s Servile Language to Esau in Genesis 33.1-17," 
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, 38.3(2014), 268-9. 
36Mason, R, “Why Spinoza?” Philosophy Now, Feb/Mar 2017, Issue 
118 <https://philosophynow.org/issues/35/Why_Spinoza> (1 March 
2018). 
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“bondage” or the dependency on passions is to enter in social 
contract, in order to enjoy the benefits of civil society. The claim 
of this paper was not to present Spinoza’s social contract 
solution, but simply to underline the coherence and internal 
value of an ethics built on self-esteem, where positive reciprocity 
or gratitude plays a key role. This role is comparable to ethics 
education which always impacts larger concept of sharing of 
benefits and costs of social collaboration, if an educator has 
succeeded to pass over a model of good life, it is likely that 
future generations will remember the good example. Spinoza’s 
ethics is a philosophical ethical system which places the 
trustworthiness of ethics education in the centre of civil life, by 
focusing not only on what a philosophy can give to education but 
to what philosophy is aiming for, and the hope to transform 
human being through philosophical models. Mutual recognition, 
gratitude, positive reciprocity are as competence and generosity 
not only the ethical virtues which allow to share esteem in an 
inclusive way at school, in a way that nobody is left behind, 
competence and gratitude are the very condition of any other 
ethical social values based on reciprocity. Cooperative services 
and responsibilities in education, as in many other sectors of 
human activities, are grounded on human beings' capacity to 
share esteem, which is only understandable on a holistic global 
level with Spinoza, in a world where global standards are 
criticised on the ground of localism and petty politics. Spinoza 
uses the metaphor of God and nature to express a global 
dimension of ethics. The importance a globally active nature of the 
highest ethical values for the human being is defined as “natura 
naturans”, as the presence of a divine model in life. The beauty of 
Spinoza’s divine presence is related to the self-sustaining and 
immanentist view of the relation of the mind and body, where 
there is always a door open for a fruitful dialogue between life as 
a whole and the Englobing Whole. The symbolic entry door for 
community is not a swinging door model, or an invitation for 
isolated contemplation of God, but common values lived in 
positive reciprocity, in search for reciprocal understanding, a 
precondition for any meaningful notion of social contract. 
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“WHEN IN THE ‘BROTHER’ THE 
STRANGER IS ACKNOWLEDGED” 
From Identity to Alterity and Dialogue, 
According to Emmanuel Levinas 
Roger Burggraeve 
Abstract: A crucial question in a pluralist society is how justice 
can be done to alterity without endangering thereby one’s 
identity. Levinas’ dialogical phenomenology of the same and 
the other, and of responsibility, sets us on the track of 
‘fraternity’ as human condition. As ethical condition of 
‘solidarity’ this fraternity transcends sex and gender, even if the 
concept is originally rooted in biology. Inspired by Levinas, it is 
explained how fraternity attains its full sense when, in the 
brother, the stranger is acknowledged (and not the opposite: 
‘when in the stranger the brother is recognized’). This ‘ethical 
fraternity’ makes it possible to realize equality in society, and to 
promote a respectful and authentic inter-religious, or rather 
‘interconvictional’ dialogue. Such an open dialogue appeals to 
an asymmetric and reciprocal mastership and critical learning 
from each other. 
Keywords: Alterity, Brother, Fraternity, Identity, Inter-
convictional Dialogue, Mastership, Responsibility.  
1. Introduction 
In societies wherein diversity increases quantitatively and 
qualitatively, the experience of alterity becomes a huge 
                                               
Prof Roger Burggraeve Prof Roger Burggraeve, SDB (Passendale, 
Belgium, 1942) is an internationally renowned Levinas Scholar, at the 
Catholic University Leuven (Belgium). He published numerous books, 
articles, and contributions on Levinas’ phenomenological, ethical, 
metaphysical and Talmudic philosophy in Dutch, English, French, 
German, and Italian. See among others: Proximity with the Other. A 
Multidimensional Ethic of Responsibility in Levinas, Bangalore: 
Dharmaram Publications, 2009.   
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challenge. A crucial question in society is how one can do 
justice to alterity without thereby endangering one’s own 
identity. This requires a reflection on identity and alterity and 
their mutual relationship. In this reflection, the dialogical 
thought of Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1995)1 will be our guide. 
                                               
1For the references to the works of Levinas, the following 
abbreviations of the original French edition, along with the cited 
page(s), are used throughout this essay. The cited page(s) from the 
available English translations is (are) indicated after the forward slash 
(/): AE: Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, La Haye: Nijhoff, 1974. 
[English translation (ET): Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. 
A. Lingis, The Hague/Boston/London: Nijhoff (Kluwer), 1981]; AS: 
Autrement que savoir (Interventions dans les Discussions & Débat 
général), Paris: Osiris, 1988; AT: Altérité et transcendance, Montpellier, 
Fata Morgana, 1995. [ET: Alterity and Transcendence, trans., M. B. Smith, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.]; DL: Difficile Liberté. 
Essais sur le Judaïsme, Paris: Albin Michel, 1976 (2nd ed.). [ET: Difficult 
Freedom. Essays on Judaism, trans., S. Hand, Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1990.]; DVI: De Dieu qui vient à l’idée, Paris: 
Vrin, 1982. [ET: Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans., Bergo, Stanford 
(CA): Stanford University Press, 1998.]; EI: Éthique et Infini. Dialogues 
avec Philippe Nemo, Paris: Fayard & France Culture, 1982. [ET: Ethics 
and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans., R. A. Cohen, 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985.]; EN: Entre nous: Essais 
sur le penser-a-l’autre, Paris: Grasset, 1991. [ET: Entre nous. Thinking-of-
the-Other, trans., M. B. Smith and B. Harshav, London/New York: 
Continuum, 2006.]; HAH: Humanisme de l’autre homme, Montpellier, 
Fata Morgana, 1972. [ET: Humanism of the Other, trans., N. Poller, 
Urbana & Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 2003.]; HS: Hors sujet, 
Montpellier, Fata Morgana, 1987. [ET: Outside the Subject, trans., M. B. 
Smith, London: The Athlone Press, 1993.]; EE: De l’existence à l’existant, 
Paris: Vrin, 1978 (2nd ed.). [ET: Existence and Existents, trans., by A. 
Lingis, The Hague/Boston: Nijhoff, 1978.]; IRB: Is It Righteous to Be. 
Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, ed., J. Robbins and trans., J. Robbins, 
M. Coelen, with T. Loebel, Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 
2001; DMT: Dieu, la mort et le temps (Établissement du texte, notes et 
postface de J. Rolland), Paris: Grasset, 1993. [ET: God, Death, and Time, 
trans., B. Bergo, Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 2000.]; NP: 
Noms propres (Essais), Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1976. [ET: Proper 
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His phenomenology of the same and the other, of which the self 
and the other are eminent expressions, sets him on the track of 
fraternity as a human condition. The realisation of this 
fraternity acquires different forms depending on whether 
identity or alterity comes to take a central position. Starting 
from fraternity where the other is approached and ‘recognised’ 
as ‘alter ego’, we will follow Levinas in his attempt at a 
surpassing towards an authentic fraternity where the other is 
given full acknowledgement as other. At the same time, it will 
become clear how this acknowledgement reaches farther than 
tolerance and implies, as justice, an exceptional form of 
mastership that, in turn, makes true, candid dialogue possible. 
Along the way, a few implications for ‘inter-religious’ or rather 
‘interconvictional’ dialogue’2 will be pointed out.  
                                               
Names, Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 1996.]; NLT: 
Nouvelles lectures talmudiques, Paris: Minuit, 1996. [ET: New Talmudic 
Readings, trans., R. A. Cohen, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1999.]; NTR: Nine Talmudic Readings, trans., A. Aronowicz, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1990; PM: 
“The Paradox of Morality” (interview with T. Wright, P. Hughes, A. 
Ainly), trans., A. Benjamin & T. Wright, in: R. Bernasconi and D. Woos 
eds., The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, London: 
Routledge, 1988, 168-180; QLT: Quatre Lectures talmudiques, Paris: 
Minuit, 1968. [ET: “Four Talmudic Readings,” NTR, 1-88.]; SaS: Du 
sacré au saint: Cinq nouvelles lectures talmudiques, Paris: Minuit, 1977. 
[ET: “From the Sacred to the Holy. Five New Talmudic Readings,” 
NTR, 89-197.]; TA: Le temps et l’autre, Montpellier, Fata Morgana, 1979 
(2nd ed.). [ET: Time and the Other, trans., R. A. Cohen, Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1987.]; TI: Totalité et Infini: Essai sur 
l’extériorité, La Haye, Nijhoff, 1961. [ET: Totality and Infinity: An Essay 
on Exteriority, trans., A. Lingis, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1979.]; VA: “La vocation de l’autre” (interview by 
Emmanuel Hirsch), in: E. HIRSCH, Racismes: L’autre et son visage, Paris: 
Cerf, 1988, 89-102. [ET: “The Vocation of the Other,” trans., J. Robbins, 
in IRB, 105-113.]. 
2We opt for the term ‘interconvictional’ because it can be 
understood inclusively, namely both for ‘inter-religious dialogue’ 
between organised religions as well as for the dialogue between 
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2. ‘Fraternity’3 as Human Condition 
Modern, enlightened thought – and in its wake, not only 
modern but also late- and so-called postmodern Western 
culture – has succeeded rather well (although much work still 
remains to be done!) to give shape to the first two elements of 
the triptych of the French Revolution: Liberté, égalité, fraternité – 
Freedom, Equality, Fraternity. Striving for autonomy and 
emancipation are not only core concepts but also value labels 
that pervade contemporary enlightened humanism strongly. 
However, they run the risk of lapsing into one-sidedness if they 
are not intimately linked with the idea of ‘fraternity’. Hence our 
proposal, out of Levinas, to re-arrange the triptych from now 
on to: “fraternity, equality, freedom”, with the understanding 
that fraternity does not come at the cost of equality and 
freedom but rather inspires and orientates them (HS 187/125). 
In this in general human ‘fraternity’ that transcends sex and 
gender, Levinas sees a form of responsibility of people for each 
other whereby the starting-point does not lie in the ‘I’ but in the 
face of the other that arouses me and calls me to responsibility. 
The starting-point for this responsibility is not found in the ‘I’-
myself but in the other, or rather in the epiphany of the other 
(for it is not the other that takes the initiative for that 
responsibility, but it is through its ‘being’ and ‘appearing’ – 
epiphany – itself that I am made responsible). Think for 
                                               
ideologies, worldviews and philosophical convictions that can also be 
non-religious. Take for instance ‘secular-humanist’ forms of 
spirituality and the creation of meaning. 
3Since Levinas himself uses explicitly and consistently the term 
‘fraterinité’ (fraternity) to present his view on human relationships, we 
shall not replace his language-use with a ‘gender-neutral’ formulation 
(although Levinas also makes use of gender-neutral words). After all, 
the surpassing of the ‘gender-specific’ meaning of ‘fraternity’ – as will 
be made apparent throughout this essay – forms an essential part of 
his view on the human condition. To make clear that throughout our 
essay we understand fraternity, and likewise brother in a gender-
transcending manner, we place both words between quotation marks: 
‘fraternity’ – ‘brother’.  
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instance of the responsibility of begetters for the child they 
beget out of their active, free choice and how they at the same 
time become responsible for the child they receive as ‘other’. By 
means of its ‘appearing’ (epiphany) the other directs itself to 
me as an appeal for responsibility. This heteronomous 
responsibility begins with the prohibition ‘do not kill’ the other 
(walk on by indifferently, abandon, exclude, deny, hate, 
tyrannise, exterminate … – violence knows innumerably many 
forms). It unfolds itself in the commandment to acknowledge 
and promote the other, and thus promote its well-being: the 
work of goodness in its many forms (TI 172/198, 200/225, 
281/304). 
This responsibility-by-and-for-the-other reveals itself as a 
paradoxical proximity, in the sense that through the appeal of 
its face, the other comes tangibly near me, and at the same time 
remains infinitely separate from me. The difference between me 
and the other – expressed in the irreducible otherness of the 
other – is, ethically speaking, the appeal to the highest ‘non-
indifference’: proximity without absorption nor fusion. The 
ethical proximity is the most original form of approach and 
contact whereby the other becomes a ‘you’ – or rather a ‘Thou’ 
– and the ‘I’ becomes a chosen ‘I’, which can be expressed as ‘me 
voici’ – ‘Here I am’: reciprocity that does not eliminate the 
asymmetry (AE 104/82). 
The ethical proximity of the one-for-the-other reveals our 
human condition as ‘fraternity’ or “the original fact of 
fraternity” (TI 189/215), namely a ‘fraternity’ that precedes our 
freedom. It is about a bondedness that precedes every active 
choice to bond oneself with the other. We are already bonded 
with each other, even before we can bind ourselves with each 
other. We are (passively) bonded in destiny even before we can 
(actively) enter into the destiny of the other. When Cain, 
according to the well-known ‘origins narrative’ in the Bible, 
poses the question after the murder of his brother “Am I my 
brother’s keeper?” (Genesis 4,9), we must understand this 
literally as: we are already bonded with each other, so much so 
that we owe it to each other – actively and creatively – to bind 
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ourselves to the other. That is our ‘createdness’ (‘créaturalité’ or 
‘créature’ as Levinas likewise says) (AE 117/192, 140/195). We 
are not first neutral beings, who then turn to each other on the 
basis of a free choice. We are, from the very beginning, 
assigned to each other ‘face-to-face’. And on the basis of this 
bondedness that precedes our commitment (AE 174/136), we 
are called to choose freely for each other. In spite of myself, the 
well-being of the other concerns me: “I am bound to the other, 
before any liaison contracted” (AE 109/87). 
And immediately Levinas qualifies this ethical ‘fraternity’ as 
“a relation of kinship, outside all biology” (AE 109/87). 
‘Fraternity’ as the heteronomous condition of existence 
surpasses, in other words, every sex- and gender-specific 
particularity of ‘brothers and sisters who are born from the 
same parents’.4 Despite this surpassing, Levinas remains, 
                                               
4This surpassing of sex- and gender-difference does not mean that 
Levinas would not pay any attention to this difference. On the 
contrary, from the beginning, namely in ‘Le temps et l’autre – Time 
and the Other’ (1947), up to ‘Totalité et Infini – Totality and Infinity’ 
(1961) and ‘Difficile Liberté – Difficult Freedom’ (1962), he pays 
attention explicitly and extensively to sexual difference and its 
meaning (and his views on ‘woman’ has provoked much controversy 
and critique). But at the same time, from the beginning of his 
independent reflection (beyond Husserl, his teacher in 
phenomenology), there appears a sex- and gender-transcending 
interpretation of ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’, that both qualify every 
human being (TA 34/54; EI /68/66). And as will be made apparent 
further, he developed in his second major work ‘Autrement qu’être – 
Otherwise than Being’ (1974) the sex- and gender-transcending 
significance of the human condition as ‘motherhood’ with which he 
qualifies ‘brotherhood’ as a modality of human-being. This shows how 
the concept of ‘fraternity’ should not be isolated from other concepts 
like bondedness, solidarity…, in the sense that all these concepts 
clarify each other in an interactive cluster. Last but not least, he 
developed in his Talmud commentary ‘Et Dieu créa la femme - And 
God created woman’ (1972) the idea that the ‘human’ surpasses sexual 
difference (and its meanings) by preceding it. It is only within the 
context of the human that the division into masculine and feminine 
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besides the sex- and gender-neutral terms ‘bondedness’ and 
‘solidarity’, using the term ‘fraternity’ whereby one 
inadvertently also begins to think of its biological meaning. 
Levinas does so intentionally, for between human and 
biological ‘fraternity’ he discovers – in spite of their radical 
difference – an undeniable analogy, in the sense that the 
biological announces the ethical ‘fraternity’ and ‘prefigures’ it. 
Just as brothers and sisters do not choose each other, but 
despite themselves – through birth – are embroiled in a 
common destiny, thus are people also embroiled in an ethical 
destiny: interconnectedness in spite of themselves, without 
preceding agreements. In other words, biology is less 
contingent and accidental than it seems at first sight. It delivers 
a prototype of our human relationships, even though these 
relationships also reach further than and free themselves from 
biology (TI 256-257/279). 
Hence Levinas has no difficulties qualifying human 
‘fraternity’ also as ‘motherhood’ and ‘pregnancy’, in the sense 
                                               
takes place (SaS 126/164, 132/167, 133/168). The human governs sex 
and gender (SaS 135/169), which means that maleness and femaleness 
are secondary with regard to human-being: “Man and women, when 
authentically human, work together as responsible beings. The sexual 
[and gender] are only the accessory of the human” (SaS 131/170). 
“Fundamental are the tasks that human beings accomplish as human 
beings and that [man and] women accomplish as human beings. They 
have other things to do besides cooing, and, moreover, something else 
to do and more, than to limit themselves to the relations that are 
established because of the differences in sex [and gender]. Sexual 
liberation, by itself, would not be a revolution adequate to the human 
species” (SaS 135/169). In other words, relationships based on sexual 
and gender differences are subordinated to – and have to be inspired 
ethically by – the interhuman relation of responsibility-by-and-for-the-
other – irreducible to the drives and the complexes of the libido – to 
which woman rises as well as man (SaS 148/177). The transcendence 
of the human with regard to sex and gender likewise justifies the use 
of gender-neutral terms, as Levinas himself does when he qualifies 
‘human fraternity’ as responsibility, alliance-before-contract, 
proximity, solidarity, etc. 
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that – beyond all sex-related meanings – these metaphors 
express how our inter-human bondedness takes place as an 
‘ethical motherhood’: “gestation of the other in the same” 
(‘gestation de l’autre dans le même’) (AE 95/75). Responsibility for 
the other as ethical pregnancy, not as a wish and free choice, 
but as a calling – as an already being called – preceding all 
conscious and free self-determination. Levinas does not see this 
as a kind of spiritual metaphor but as the indication of the real 
and necessary incarnation of the ethical subject. The soul, as 
‘ensoulment of the same by the other’, is only possible as 
embodied animation. That we in our deepest being, deeper 
than our consciousness, are marked by the ‘being for the other’, 
is just as radically and pre-originally inscribed in our bodies. In 
this regard, Levinas can state that our body is our soul: “The 
psyche is the maternal body” (‘psychsime comme un corps 
maternel’) (AE 85/67). I am in and through my exposed and 
vulnerable body already connected with the other, even before 
I can link and identify myself with my body as ‘my’ body (AE 
96/76). Being an ensouled body here means “having the other 
in one’s skin” (‘avoir-l’autre-dans-sa-peau’) (AE 146/115): we are 
able to be ‘occupied’ with the other because the other already 
‘occupies’ or ‘sits inside’ us, in the sense that the directedness 
towards the other marks and ensouls our bodiliness and 
precisely in so doing makes it ‘sensible’ for the other. And this 
sensibility is not only corporeal but also ‘passive’: the bearing 
of the other is a bearing even of the passion and suffering of the 
other: “the bearing par excellence” (‘le porter par excellence’) (AE 
95/75, 132/104), ‘uterinity’ of the human subject as “trembling 
of the womb” (le frémissement des entrailles utérines) (SaS 
158/183) or ”moaning of the entrails” (gémissement des entrailles) 
(HAH 94/64): “perhaps maternity is sensibility itself, of which 
so much ill is said among the Nietzscheans” (SaS 158/183). 
Ethical brotherhood as ethical pregnancy and maternity, 
condition of every human being, male or female, prior to 
freedom (AE 148-149/116).  
This condition of existence of ‘fraternity prior to freedom’, 
however, does not exclude but rather includes freedom (AE 
"'When in the ‘Brother’ the Stranger is Acknowledged': Levinas" 293 
  
Journal of Dharma 43, 3 (July-September 2018) 
211/166). It does make freedom into an inspired freedom, i.e. a 
freedom that is ensouled by the ‘for-the-other’ of responsibility. 
It does not concern a formal freedom, namely the free will 
(‘liberum arbitrium’) that can choose between two equally 
neutral possibilities, but rather an ‘orientated’ freedom that is 
raised above itself towards the other than itself. But this pre-
conscious and pre-consensual ‘orientation’ of freedom is not a 
doom, coercion or unavoidable fatality. Human ‘fraternity’ is 
“prior to the free and the non-free” (AE 14/12). The passive 
‘ensoulment’ by and for the other is not about an ‘irresistible 
inclination’ (AE 157/197) or a kind of ‘natural instinct’ (AE 
175/138), and still less a ‘divine predestination’ to which I 
would – as a ‘merciless mercy’ – be inexorably surrendered (AE 
160/124). Rather, it concerns a ‘being-appealed-to’ or an 
‘appealability’ to which I can respond positively or negatively. 
My freedom thus no longer has the first word, but it neither is 
eliminated. On the contrary, it is summoned in order to 
effectively concur with and substantiate the fraternity within 
which I in spite of myself am ‘situated’. Freedom is called to a 
response, and is likewise the possibility to respond. I must say 
yes, but I can say no. The covenant of fraternity, in which I find 
myself, is no ontological or natural ‘necessity’, just as an object 
that is released must necessarily fall, surrendered as it is to the 
laws of gravity. It concerns an appeal, a task and a mission, 
which stands in sharp contrast to all (external or internal) 
coercion and inevitability. Fraternity presents itself as an 
‘authority’ that cannot impose anything, but can only appeal 
and oblige. The Good of the ‘by-and-for-the-other’ in which I 
am ‘created’ is a ‘disarming authority’ that can only make a 
claim on me by appealing to my free, good will (AS 69). With 
this, it is useful to distinguish between two forms of ‘must’, 
namely an ‘incontrovertible’ and an ‘irresistible’ must (AE 
154/120). The duty to take upon oneself the fate of the other – a 
duty that is directed toward me immediately and 
incontrovertibly from the face – can indeed be very much 
resisted. We can simply ignore the appeal that proceeds from 
the other: much is not even necessary, a slight distraction 
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would suffice… After all, an irresistible ‘must’ would not be an 
ethical ‘must’ but a not-being-able-to-do-otherwise. We can 
choose to do or not to do that which we must, and that is 
precisely our ethical freedom – the freedom of response. 
Confronted with the incontrovertible appeal of the vulnerable 
other, we can pretend that we have not noticed that appeal. The 
appeal can be pushed away or muffled away amidst other 
summons and obligations. It can be overrun by the drive for 
self-preservation, which can manifest itself imposingly or 
subtly, or it can hide itself in boredom, absent-mindedness or 
diversion, fatigue or laziness (as anticipated fatigue). That, 
however, does not change anything of the incontrovertible 
character of the appeal that ensues from the face. We can escape 
from it by turning away our gaze or by pretending not to have 
noticed the appeal of its epiphany, but this ‘pretending’ already 
demonstrates that we have ‘heard’ the appeal, namely that an 
urgent ‘must’ has ensued from the vulnerable other, my 
brother. Heteronomy is, in other words, the basis for autonomy, 
which the so-called modern, ‘revolutionary’ concept of freedom 
has turned entirely inside out. Thanks to the heteronomy of 
ethical ‘fraternity’ wherein we in spite of ourselves are situated, 
we can autonomously acknowledge or reject, fulfil or neglect, 
this ‘fraternity’. On the basis of a fundamental ethical option, 
whereby we establish good or evil, we confirm ‘fraternity’ as 
our ‘human being’ or rather as our ‘humanity’ itself (TI 
189/204; AE 10/8, 17/14). 
In other words, negotiation, agreement and contract do not 
fall outside the responsibility of people for each other. It is not 
because the ‘dialogical’ precedes the ‘dialogue’ that the 
concrete conversation would be unimportant (DVI 224/146). 
On the contrary, the concrete dialogue is, as still will be made 
apparent below, called to give expression to the original, or 
rather pre-original condition of ‘fraternity’ wherein we are 
‘placed’ and ‘anchored’. It is precisely the goal of our essay to 
investigate how and which conversation can give shape in an 
authentic manner to ‘fraternity’ as an expression of the 
humanum, that implies in the spirit of the French Revolution the 
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‘equality’ or rather the ‘common dignity’ of all people. Our 
human condition of ‘fraternity’ shows, in other words, from the 
beginning a universal, inclusive dimension: every human 
person is responsible for every other human person. The 
responsibility of the one-for-the-other refers to a general, 
shared humanity as the basis of our irreducible equality, for 
which we all and together are actively and creatively 
responsible (TI 189/214). 
3. When in the Stranger I Recognize My ‘Brother’  
The experience and the realisation of this universal ‘fraternity’ 
is thus not self-explanatory, and even less a romantic dream 
that falls like a gift from the sky. The human person after all is 
an ‘ambiguous’ being in the literal sense of the word. As we 
stated above, the human person is not determined to be for-the-
other (‘otherwise than being’). He can also look the other way. 
The possibility of this choice is neither neutral nor formal, but 
is marked by the ‘being’ of the human person, just as it is 
observed by us at first sight, namely his spontaneous 
egocentrism of the ‘attempt at being’ (conatus essendi) (Spinoza) 
(NP 104/71). In de ‘struggle for life’ (Darwin) or the ‘élan vital’ 
(vital impulse) of the human person (Bergson) (EE 29/23; TI 
253/276), something strange is revealed: there is something 
more important than ‘my own life’, namely the life of the other 
(PM 172), as was made clear above in our phenomenology of 
‘fraternity’. This does not preclude that in or in spite of that 
‘being-for-the-other’, the ‘being for oneself’ remains operative, 
driven as every human person is to cope with the problems that 
are caused by one’s own finitude and fragility (AE 4/4; AS 63-
64). 
This primary ‘dynamism of being’ in the human person 
implies the inclination to organise ‘fraternity’ on the basis of 
self-interest, or rather of mutual self-interest, i.e., of reciprocally 
well-understood egoism. In other words, ‘fraternity’ realises 
itself in a first movement through all sorts of ‘fraternities’ or 
‘brotherhoods’ that come about amongst like-minded 
individuals, meaning to say amongst people who recognise 
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themselves in the other on the basis of all kinds of ‘affinities’, 
similar characteristics, interests or concerns, activities, 
convictions and ideas. Such fraternities rest on the reciprocity 
of sympathy, according to Levinas (TA 86/91). We start with 
this phenomenology, in order to reflect further on ‘identitary 
fraternity’. 
In our spontaneous longing, we strive for reciprocity on the 
basis of recognition. Thanks to the other, I would like to arrive 
home in myself: the one is for the other what the other is for the 
one. Thanks to sympathy, the other is known as another ‘my-
self’, i.e., as an ‘alter ego’ (TA 75/83). I find myself again in the 
other, in her or his characteristics, and I am thereby attracted to 
the other. It is the dream of a common existence which we all 
share commonly and mutually. Sympathy appears here as the 
relationship of direct exchange because we are accessible to 
each other and understand each other, at times with but half a 
word or a glance. In and through its sympathy, the other puts 
oneself in my place, sees and treats me as ‘similar’ (semblable) – 
which is not the same as ‘equal’. Thanks to our mutual 
‘resemblances’ (DMT 51/40) we become one with each other, 
we form a ‘brotherhood’ of mutual ‘intropathy’ and 
understanding (HS 169/113). Today, this reciprocity is often 
called ‘empathy’, based on the ability to allow oneself to live 
‘within’ the other, with the expectation that the other also 
allows oneself to live ‘within’ our existence and our 
experiences. 
This ‘brotherly’ reciprocity is not only aimed for in inter-
personal relations but also in the formation of all kinds of 
groups and communities. Humans are not solitary but social 
beings (Aristotle). Humans, after all, do not fall out of the sky 
but are born. By means of their ancestry, people belong to a 
group, with its own characteristics and customs. The first 
environment where people belong to is the family. Via the 
family, one belongs to other groups, namely those of ethnicity 
and nationality (and in this word lies the concept ‘nasci’ – to be 
born). The factual circumstances of the birth determine to a 
large part to which group we belong. Via ethnicity or 
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nationality we are likewise embedded, among others, in a 
network of relationships with quite specific economic, political, 
cultural and historical characteristics. This uniqueness, which 
distinguishes one group of people from other groups, is usually 
experienced as ‘natural’, on the basis of the pre-given objective 
character and on the basis of the fact that that objective identity 
usually also has a well-established past. 
Upon closer inspection, however, it turns out that that 
uniqueness is always the result of construction and 
development. But however this history is at work, the 
uniqueness is always experienced as participating in 
characteristics, features, customs and traditions that – often 
separately, but certainly in their specific coherence as well – 
differ from other particularities with their own characteristics, 
value patterns and behaviours. It is precisely in and through 
this belonging to groups and communities that people develop, 
at the same time, their social identity. It would seem that this 
social identity is external in nature, but what is unique to 
human persons is that they identify themselves with them so 
much so that they transform these communitarian forms of 
identity and experience them as internal forms of identity: an 
experience of reciprocity that offers the satisfaction of security: 
we arrive at home with each other. 
The differences between groups of people, in other words, 
can be traced back to attributes, features and characteristics 
whereby they can be assigned a specific particularity: family, 
people, race, gender, culture … Mostly, these specific 
characteristics are united and ‘arranged’ into a cluster, with its 
own internal – whether or not historically or artificially 
construed – cohesion, whereby people can be distinguished 
from each other not only individually but also socially. We can 
call this particularity the ‘natural’ identity of groups, and in this 
regard also label it as valuable and worthwhile: “It is not that 
the tribal is proscribed; it comprises many virtues” (VA 
96/109). The cognateness, whatever type it may be, is in no way 
evil and should thus not be suppressed or forbidden. It ushers 
in numerous possibilities and expresses itself moreover in 
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many praiseworthy qualities and virtues, like internal, warm 
solidarity within this ‘shared destiny’. Various ‘fraternities’ are 
an eminent expression of this. 
Last but not least, the ideological communities (religions and 
others) to which one belongs usually by birth – unless if by 
conversion – likewise give shape to this social identity. They 
express a unique ‘internal world’ with its own language-use, 
symbols, rituals, narratives and convictions. It is no coincidence 
that they come to the fore in this context of ‘brotherhood’ and 
‘fraternities’, wherein the so-called ‘symbolic order’ of signs 
and rituals, ‘sacred’ places with their particular arrangement, 
language and forms of expression (like ways of greeting, 
garments, headwear, etc.), calendars and feasts, all play a 
‘foundational’ and ‘inspirational’ role. Furthermore, the 
community life of such identitary ‘fraternities’ is objectified in 
forms of organisation and structures, statutes and regulations 
(including the criteria of surveillance and sanctioning). That is 
the tangible, objective incarnation of the ideological fraternity – 
and of every identitary fraternity – as a social dynamism. 
Reversing a paradoxical statement of Levinas (cf. infra), we 
can summarise these considerations on the ‘identitary 
fraternity’ as follows: “When I recognize my ‘brother’ in the 
stranger”. And Levinas does not hesitate linking this idea with 
the way in which Israel has evolved from being nomads to 
being the ‘chosen people’. As the ‘chosen people’ Israel 
experiences its ‘being set apart’ from other peoples as a source 
of value and dignity, upon which its individuality precisely 
rests. Even when this election may not lead to the haughty 
pretence of being ‘better’ than others, it still gives a special 
significance to the existence of the people of Israel, out of which 
ensues an ineradicable feeling of self-worth. Levinas points out 
expressly how the Bible is also the book of a people (VA 
97/109) and how the children of Israel, according to that 
Biblical tradition, are presented as the descendants of the 
patriarchs. They receive the vocation and mission to 
substantiate being the chosen people by keeping the covenant, 
by maintaining and studying the Mitzvoth of the Torah (cf. the 
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Talmud as a ‘unique’ form of Jewish thought). Hence Levinas 
affirms: “The children of Israel are introduced as the 
descendants of the patriarchs. Consequently, the virtues of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the glory of their relations to other 
men, are presented as very elevated” (VA 96/109). At the end 
of this essay, it will become clear how this is not an end-point, 
in the sense that for Israel (and for the Bible) a ‘beyond-the-
tribal’ is necessary, just as this likewise applies to all 
‘fraternities’. 
4. When in My ‘Brother’ I Acknowledge the Stranger  
However valuable it may be, the ‘tribal’ fraternity can never be 
an endpoint. It is not the sufficient precondition for humanity 
in the full sense of the word. Upon closer inspection, it remains 
after all based on ‘recognition’ (EN 40/24). This means that the 
‘intropathy’ of sympathy and empathy, beyond deductive 
knowledge, is positive (EI 58-59/58), but at the same time it 
does not go far enough. Even though as ‘vibration’ it is an 
‘experience-beyond-knowing’, it remains a form of reciprocity 
(DVI 63/64), or rather a form of “mutual knowledge” (HS 
151/101). One starts with the observation of the other who 
appears just like I do, in order to be involved with the other as 
an other-who-is-related-to-me. It is and remains a form of 
knowledge that makes finding oneself in the other possible. The 
question consequently is, how can we reach beyond the 
reductive reciprocity, into the other as other, into a relationship 
that is more – or better, different, radically different – than 
observing and empathising knowledge (EN 254/194). 
For that purpose, the tribal and the identitary ‘fraternity’ 
must be surpassed, a “scandalous exigency” (VA 96/109), but – 
along the road to humanisation – a necessary exigency! We can 
concretise this demand by reversing the above-mentioned 
expression regarding the “recognition of the ‘brother’ in the 
strange other”, namely into the ethical appeal “to acknowledge, 
in the ‘brother’ himself, the stranger: the moment in which 
fraternity attains its full sense” (VA 96/109). 
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To make this clear, we base ourselves on the distinction that 
we, in line with Levinas, can make between ‘countenance’ and 
‘face’. This distinction – yes even contradistinction – is 
important for all too often are both confused with each other. In 
that confusion, the face is then understood as the face of the 
other, meaning to say as her or his physiognomy, the facial 
features, the plastic or graphic form, in short the ‘visibility’ of 
the other. It is that which can be brought forth in an image, and 
thus in extension also the personality and the character, the 
psycho-social, ethnic, cultural, religious or ideological… 
characteristics of the other (VA 97/110). On that basis, the other 
can be catalogued and ‘diagnosed’, likewise on the basis of its 
belongingness to groups, communities, or ‘fraternities’. What 
Levinas means, however, with the face of the other is not its 
countenance or its appearance, but the remarkable given that 
the other – not only factually, but also principally – never 
coincides with its appearance, image, photograph, presentation 
or belongingness to a group. Hence he states that the other is 
invisible and unknowable: a mystery that never surrenders 
itself (TI 4/34). That is why, according to Levinas, we cannot 
actually speak about a ‘phenomenology’ of the face, since 
phenomenology describes that which appears. The face is that 
which in the face of the other escapes from our glance. The 
other is ‘different’, irreducible to its appearance, literally a 
‘stranger’, and precisely as such the other reveals itself as face. 
Naturally, the other is also visible; naturally, the other appears 
and thus evokes all sorts of impressions, images and 
representations whereby the other can be described and 
characterised personally and in terms of its group. Naturally, 
we can come to know quite a lot about the other on the basis of 
what the other lets us ‘see’. But the other is more than its 
photograph, or rather he is not only factually more – in the 
sense that I can discover even more about the other – but it can 
never be adequately represented and contained in one or the 
other image. And because it is not ‘understandable’, it is neither 
‘graspable’. It is essentially, and not only factually or 
temporarily, a ‘withdrawing’ and ‘transcending movement’. I 
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can never capture the other into nor identify it with its plastic 
form, its historiography or its psychological, sociological, 
ethnic, cultural or ideological Gestalt. The other is never simply 
the expression or the ‘sacrament’ of its ‘fraternity’, i.e., 
community, social group or ideological ‘church’. Its ‘epiphany’ 
takes place paradoxically as a withdrawal, literally a ‘retreat’. 
Its epiphany is always a breaking through and a confounding 
of this epiphany whereby the other always remains ‘enigmatic’, 
and precisely because of that it imposes itself as the 
‘irreducible’ and the ‘strange’, in short as ‘the radical other’ that 
is and remains ‘infinitely’ other. The other is unconquerably 
‘different’ because it escapes once and for all from every 
attempt at a final representation and diagnosis. In its face, the 
other is the infinite that ‘infinitises’ itself (AE 113-116/89-91). 
The epiphany of the face makes all curiosity ridiculous. Hence 
the challenge to distrust our own seeing and interpreting, even 
though we are not directly inclined to do so due to our self-
interest (NP 153/102). 
It is precisely this infinite, or rather the ‘self-infinitising’, 
alterity that obscures and even questions the tribal ‘fraternity’ 
and familiarity. Hence the inclination to rid ourselves of the 
foreignness of the other, by means of reducing the other to our 
own identity and tribal ‘fraternity’. Levinas calls this 
“reduction of the other to the same” (TI 16/46) the unavoidable 
temptation of the tribal and even ‘brotherly’ violence – 
however contradictory ‘brotherly violence’ may even sound. 
Hence that the ‘fraternity-beyond-the-tribal’ rests on the 
prohibition against reduction and violence: “Thou shalt not 
kill” (EI 93/89), with which the awareness is given at the same 
time that a cross-border, universal ‘fraternity’ is never easy nor 
self-evident, and thus never simply falls down from heaven for 
free – not even as one or the other form of ‘divine grace’! It 
always costs time and effort, commitment and responsibility. It 
does not rest on the spontaneous inclination to sympathy or 
empathy, for that reciprocity accords insufficient 
acknowledgement to the otherness – the foreignness – of the 
other who stands before me ‘face-to-face’. The other penetrates 
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unasked into my personal and communitarian identity as the 
stranger, as a foreigner in whom I do not ‘find myself’. Perhaps 
the other – as ‘similar’ or ‘like-minded’ – seems familiar to me 
at first, but slowly but surely this familiarity gives way to a 
painful feeling of alienation, namely that the other never 
coincides with that familiarity and similarity. Unavoidably and 
unrelentingly, the other appears as the one who throws upside 
down my personal and our tribal (‘brotherly’) identity. The 
nearby and at the same time ‘foreign brother’, who in his 
familiarity becomes even more strange, introduces a 
remarkable ‘difference’ that sows uncertainty and confusion. 
The foreigner that we thus discover in the ‘brother’ literally 
means a ‘disruption of order’ or ‘dis-order’ that seems to 
undermine our tribal ‘fraternity’. Hence that our tribal 
‘fraternity’ comes under pressure, in the sense that it is tempted 
by the tendency to violence, be it in direct and brutal, or in 
indirect and more subtle or sly forms, at times making use of 
organisational ‘arrangements’ and rules and sanctions. On the 
ideological (religious, convictional…) level, we distinguish on 
the one hand inclusivism, whereby the truth of the other is 
reduced to our own truth or whereby our own truth is 
imprinted onto the other – via all sorts of ‘techniques of 
persuasion.’ On the other hand, there is exclusivism that not 
only excludes and rejects, but also diabolises and persecutes the 
other as ‘foreign’. And this is expressed in all kinds of terror 
and racism: “In the expression of racism, one experiences 
human identity uniquely on the basis of its persistence in being, 
while turning qualitative differences and attributes into a value, 
as in the apperception of things that one would possess or 
reject” (VA 98/110-111). The subtlest form of inter-convictional 
violence is the indifference towards the foreign other, in the 
sense that one – out of a feeling of superiority or of self-defence 
– finds the dialogue with the other irrelevant and superfluous. 
This means that the surpassing of the tribal ‘fraternity’ is 
only feasible by means of the confrontation with the permanent 
and recurrent possibility of violence towards the foreign other, 
i.e., mainly the attempt to transform the other into a ‘similar’ or 
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‘like-minded’ ‘brother’. Then one can be ‘in agreement’ 
amongst each other, beyond all differences which one 
relativises. This enforces indeed the warmth of immanent 
solidarity, but at the same time it goes at the cost of the real 
dialogue with the ‘brother’ wherein the foreign other reveals 
oneself.  
Hence, the cross-border ‘open fraternity’ is in need of the 
ethical ‘restraint’ (NLT 94-96/123-126). This is a form of 
scrupulousness, which refers back to the Latin scrupulus, ‘a 
pebble in the shoe’. The surpassing of the tribal ‘fraternity’ into 
an open ‘fraternity’ does not begin as a great, spontaneous 
magnanimity that is directed at the other ‘with pleasure’. The 
dialogue between ‘stranger brothers’ begins with a form of 
unease and ‘embarrassment’ precisely because one is brought 
to shyness through the epiphany of the strange other. The most 
original ethical moment of the conversation with a real ‘other’ 
does not consist in doing something, namely in confiscating the 
other’s time and being. The ethical encounter with the foreign 
‘other’ begins with withholding the spontaneous inclination of 
‘sympathy’ that seeks ‘recognition’ in the other in order to 
avoid all diligence with regard to the other. The ethical ‘fait 
primitif’ of dialogue is no altruism, neither sympathy nor 
empathy, but a dynamics of ‘shivering’ (AE 110/120). This is 
namely an utmost circumspection and carefulness, 
apprehensive as we are to do injustice to the other in all our 
forward-marching self-certainty (AE 86/68). The moment that 
‘brotherly’ dialogue ‘founds’ and installs itself ethically, i.e., 
becomes fully humane, consists in ‘something from nothing’, 
namely in the ‘scruple’ that nestles itself in the spontaneous 
movement of establishing, defending and developing one’s 
own (personal and communitarian) identity, distinct from other 
identities or ‘brotherhoods’. An ethically qualitative dialogue 
begins with the suspension of all self-evidence with which we 
approach the other, foreign conversation-partner in ‘self-
complacency’ and self-certainty. An authentic dialogue that 
encourages connection does not begin with a self-aggrandising 
enthusiasm but with a remarkable form of ‘hesitation’, whereby 
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one controls and restrains oneself in the fear that in the 
dialogue one would do violence to the other. 
We can likewise qualify this as ‘tolerance’, a first step in the 
relationship with the foreign other. The literal meaning of 
‘tolerare’ is to put up with, to endure, to ‘accept’ the alterity of 
the other. This is rather a negative attitude that does not 
coincide with the positive attitude of respect, justice, 
confirmation and acknowledgment, of which more will be 
discussed below. The choice for tolerance towards the other 
implies that one refrains from ‘killing’ the other, i.e. 
manipulating or abusing, or reducing the other in a subtle or 
brutal manner to oneself. Tolerance as reluctance (DL 225/172). 
This is not yet dialogue but rather the absolute, minimum 
condition for dialogue (we shall take this up again later). 
4. Mutual and Asymmetric Mastership  
The initially negative ‘restraint’ and tolerance, upon closer 
inspection, create space for an utterly positive approach to the 
other, in the sense that it makes possible the acknowledgment 
of and the respect for the other as a foreign other. In this 
regard, the open, cross-border ‘fraternity’ is based on the 
fundamental attitude of justice, namely on doing justice to the 
irreducible otherness of the other. Respect “is a relationship 
between freedoms who neither limit nor deny one another, but 
reciprocally affirm one another. Respect is adequate here, 
provided we emphasize that the reciprocity of respect is not an 
indifferent relationship, such as a serene contemplation, and 
that it is not the result, but the condition of ethics. It is 
language, that is, responsibility of the one for the other” (EN 
48/30). This reciprocity, however, should not be understood 
wrongly, in the sense that it is not a condition for respect. The 
acknowledgment by the other should not be a condition for my 
acknowledgment of the other. If such were the case, 
acknowledgment would get bogged down into utilitarianism. It 
then remains an expression of my self-interest: ‘do ut des’ (AT 
110/199). “All the shackening of the world filters through 
‘sympathetic’ faces as soon as the [asymmetric] relation of 
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mutual responsibility is suspended” (EN 49/31). In other 
words, respect is a way that people do justice to each other not 
as people who are the same but as people of equal dignity, 
regardless of what the other does for me or gives back to me 
(NP 46-47/32-33). 
The way to do justice fully to the strange otherness of the 
other is by accepting the mastership of the other, or better still 
by acknowledging and confirming it (TI 73-75/100-101), 
beyond the pretension of our own mastership toward the other 
that perhaps again runs the risk of falling in the trap of the 
reduction of the other to our own ‘conviction and view’. With 
this, we arrive at what we can call, inspired by Levinas, the 
reversal of the ‘natural’, egocentric mastership. We assume 
spontaneously that we ourselves can teach everything to the 
other, while ethical mastership turns the roles around by 
stating radically that the other is my master, whereby the 
natural asymmetry of I-to-the-other based on self-interest is 
reversed. The epiphany of the face reveals itself as instruction, 
as teaching. By means of speaking to me, the other awakes in 
me something new. I do not discover something that has 
already beforehand been slumbering within me, but I am – 
despite myself – confronted with the heteronomous fact of the 
otherness of the other that speaks to me by looking at me or 
that addresses me without words, stutteringly or explicitly. I 
cannot predict nor foresee the speaking – the revelation – of the 
other; I do not have the other ‘at hand’ and it is precisely its 
otherness that ‘makes me wise’. In the conversation that begins 
with the epiphany of the other, I am no longer the first and 
original, the alpha and omega of meaning, the ‘archè’ or 
‘principle’ to which all meaning and value return. I am no 
longer the designer, but the one addressed, the one receiving, 
the one listening, or rather the one who is awakened and called 
to listen, and who thus needs to learn everything still. Only by 
withdrawing myself from my self-complacent ‘knowing’ do I 
create space in order to learn truly from the other. To 
paraphrase Levinas, it sounds as follows: ‘The face breaks 
through its plastic form [– its physiognomy, psychology, 
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sociology, ethnicity, fraternity, culture, religion …, in short its 
countenance or appearance] – and speaks to me. The other 
‘expresses itself’ by means of addressing me. And thus is the 
face infinitely more than all that I can see and describe of it. The 
face ‘instructs me’ and calls me to dedication and attention. The 
word – the glance or the wordless word – of the other is 
magisterial: it instructs me about the other without my finding it 
within myself. Thus the other is the source of revelation. 
Listening precedes knowing and speaking. I am a response-
being, literally ‘response-able’, answerable’ (cf. TI 22/51, 41/69, 
45-46/73). Here, the idea of Plato that the soul is in 
conversation with itself, is radically transcended. In contrast 
with what Plato calls “the dialogue of immanence” (DVI 
214/139) Levinas talks of “the dialogue of transcendence” (DVI 
225/147). The learning that the face-to-face realises is not a 
solipsistic self-knowledge (‘gnothi seauton’) but a dialogical 
learning (DVI 216/140, 221/144). I do not descend into myself 
in order to find wisdom, but I step outside of myself in order to 
learn thanks to the other and become ‘wise’. This does not 
mean that I merely accept everything from the other slavishly 
and meekly. On the contrary, it does mean that I enter into 
discussion, give comments, think critically or contradict. Only 
thus do I learn new things, which can likewise bring the other 
to new insights and standpoints. This speaking and ‘counter-
speaking’ not only expresses the humane, universal ‘fraternity’ 
with which we began this essay, but it also develops it into a 
community event of fellowship that – beyond every ‘special-
arrangement-between-us’ that allows for coalescence – 
discovers, acknowledges and confirms in the ‘brother’ the other 
as other, whereby even I am done justice as the ‘strange 
brother’. 
This mastership of the other seems to be a beautiful and 
tempting idea, but upon closer inspection it is about an unruly 
idea that is anything but easy to realise. Even in the direct face-
to-face, the temptation of rhetoric is never far away. One 
searches for ‘beautiful language’ that creates the impression 
that one encounters the other and ‘walks along’ with him or 
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her. Rhetoric as “the art that is supposed to enable us to master 
language” (HS 203/135), or literally as eloquence or ‘beautiful 
saying’ (bellettrie) (HS 207/138-139), can pervert unnoticed the 
dialogue between the strange other and myself. Not every 
discourse is a relation with exteriority, the otherness of the 
other. We often approach our conversation partner not as our 
‘master’ and ‘teacher’, but “as an object or an infant, or a man 
of the multitude” (TI 40/70). Our discourse is then rhetoric and 
represents the position of someone who tries to outsmart his 
neighbour. Rhetoric, which is not at all absent in any 
conversation, approaches the other not frontally (face-to-face) 
but sideways, via a detour. To be sure, not as an object in the 
sense that the rhetorical discourse directs itself to the other 
through all its artful trickery – but indeed trying to obtain the 
‘yes’ of the other in a devious manner. As propaganda, flattery, 
diplomacy, etc. is a way to spoil the freedom of the other. In 
this regard, rhetoric is a particular form of violence: “not 
violence exercised on an inertia (which would not be a 
violence), but on a freedom, which precisely as freedom, should 
be incorruptible” (TI 42/70). The deception of rhetoric consists 
precisely in that one attempts to get the other to one’s side by 
arousing trust, namely the trustworthiness of the partial truth, 
so that the other is then prepared to take along the beautifully 
embellished lie in the guise of truth (QLT 138/64). In this way, 
rhetoric degenerates into a form of deception that hides under 
the ‘fine appearance’ of ‘convincing truth’ and thus promotes a 
form of ‘disguised violence’!  
It is precisely this possible and factual, recurrent appearance 
of misleading rhetoric in the direct face-à-face that makes the 
permanent vigilance of the shivering and restraint sketched 
above never superfluous. It likewise implies the necessary 
suspicion towards a cold-blooded dialogue whereby 
friendliness and diplomacy are used as ‘non-violent means’. 
That is a dialogue that is more concerned about the dialogue in 
the dialogue. Then it is all about a form of ‘circumspect 
tolerance’, which upon closer inspection appears to be a ‘too 
careful tolerance’. One wants to be ‘friendly’ towards each 
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other and as a consequence we run the risk that no real 
dialogue at all takes place, in the sense that we become too 
indulgent of each other or that we remain stuck in general 
declarations of goodwill. In such a dialogue without debate 
there is indeed politeness – a form of ‘decent’ and nicely 
packaged tolerance – but no real acknowledgement of each 
other’s irreducible alterity and uniqueness.  
Even in interconvictional dialogue, too much tolerance and 
caution can stand in the way of an authentic encounter on the 
basis of a discussion with an ‘open visor’. The seemingly 
‘important’ and ‘polite’ dialogue then becomes, upon closer 
inspection, a cruel and hefty debate. Wars on religion – and 
other ideological wars – arise not so much because the debates 
would be too sharp, but because they are lacking. Hence the 
importance of direct exchange whereby one draws up the 
courage not only to pose questions but also to question the 
other, and to allow oneself to be questioned as well by the 
other, however embarrassing and perhaps even painful that 
confrontation may be. When one discusses about certain 
themes, it is thus not sufficient that the participants in the 
interconvictional dialogue present their own views, but also 
that the other questions critically those views. For that purpose, 
it can be useful that the one asks the other how that other 
understands the view of the former, what questions and 
resistances does it evoke, which resonances does it uncover, but 
also where do deeper oppositions lie. By doing so, a dialogical 
‘back-and-forth’ arises that reflects what Levinas unravels in 
Rabbinic discourse, namely an ’unending commentary’ of a 
commentary on a commentary, that again unleashes new 
commentary (SaS 154/181). It is an honest and persevered 
confrontation between convictions, beyond mild forms of 
tolerance and friendliness, which upon closer inspection betray 
forms of indifference. “Attention and vigilance: not to sleep 
until the end of time, perhaps. The presence of persons who do 
not fade away into words, get lost in technical questions, freeze 
up into institutions or structures. The presence of persons in the 
full force of their irreplaceable identity, in the full force of their 
"'When in the ‘Brother’ the Stranger is Acknowledged': Levinas" 309 
  
Journal of Dharma 43, 3 (July-September 2018) 
inevitable responsibility. To acknowledge and name the 
insoluble substances and keep them from exploding in 
violence, guile or politics, to keep watch where conflicts tend to 
break out, a new religiosity and solidarity – is loving one’s 
neighbour anything other than this? Not the facile, spontaneous 
élan, but the difficult working on oneself: to go toward the other 
where he is truly other, in the radical contradiction of his 
alterity, that place from which, for an insufficiently mature 
soul, hatred flows naturally or is deduced with infallible logic” 
(AT 101/87-88). 
5. Conclusion 
Thus we arrive at the humane ‘fraternity-beyond-the-tribal’ 
with which we have begun. It introduces the connection with 
the strange other, without absorbing the other in its own 
identity, but likewise without locking up the self in its own 
world: “a surplus of fraternity” (DVI 224/147). This new ethics 
and spirituality is, according to Levinas, also essential for a 
correct understanding of Judaism as an ‘open identity’, 
meaning to say as an identity that needs transcendence. In 
Israel’s history, the children of Israel are presented as 
descendants of the patriarchs: Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. This 
origin and history likewise determine their identity. But 
according to Levinas, it is a crucial moment in the development 
of ethical and religious consciousness when the Bible links the 
awareness of human dignity with the understanding of being a 
‘child of God’, and no longer with the notion of being a ‘child 
of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob’. Levinas calls this the “filiality of 
transcendence”, “a superior form of piety, above any tribal 
link” (VA 96/109). Levinas also evokes how in the texts of 
Isaiah the Israelites call themselves ‘children of God’ and how 
in their liturgy the expression ‘our Father’ appears time and 
again. To be sure, the Bible is a book of a people (level of 
identity) but also a book of a people for whom this ‘unity as a 
people’ does not suffice (level of transcendence). It is not 
enough to only qualify oneself as ‘descendants of Abraham, 
Isaac and Jacob’, for the absolutizing interpretation of such a 
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qualification leads to exclusivism and racism. Therefore, 
Levinas finds it necessary that the people of Israel receive the 
Torah: “It does not suffice for this people merely to be 
descendants of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob: it must be led to Sinai. 
The departure from Egypt is accomplished at Sinai” (VA 
96/109). There, their election evolves into their mission, namely 
the task to uphold the Law. In other words: there, the 
particularity of their election becomes the universality of their 
responsibility, not only for their own people but also for all 
peoples. Here resounds the promise God made at the very 
beginning of Israel, namely at the calling and sending of the 
patriarch Abram: “And in you all the families of the earth shall 
be blessed” (Gen 12,2-3). And that Abram becomes the “father 
of the whole humanity” (NLT 84/114) is even linked to his new 
name Abraham: “No longer shall your name be Abram, but 
your name shall be Abraham, for I have made you the ancestor 
of a multitude of nations” (Gen 17,5). His ‘being-for-all-the-
others’, his ‘being “for all the humanity of humankind” reveals 
“a new humanity: the biblical humanism” (NLT 86/117) of 
‘universal fraternity’ as a gift of ‘createdness’ and an ethical 
task (DVI 249-250/165-166). 
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THE SELF AND THE OTHER IN LEVINAS 
AND SPINOZA 
Don Adams 
Abstract: Emmanuel Levinas in his ethics elucidates his key 
concept of the other-directed self by opposing it to the wholly 
self-interested self, as he interprets it, in the ethics of Baruch 
Spinoza. However, when we consider the Spinozan self within 
the context of his own ethical system, we find that it also 
ultimately is other-directed, but in a manner quite distinct from 
that of the Levinasian self. The contrasting ethical selves of 
Levinas and Spinoza provide alternative models of existing 
ethically in the world, both of which are in insistent opposition 
to the modern humanist valorization of the autonomous egoistic 
individual as a valid ontological concept and worthwhile ethical 
ideal. 
Keywords: Conatus Essendi, Ego, Holiness, Individual, Other, 
Self, Substitution, Virtue.  
Emmanuel Levinas in his philosophy is noted for his focus upon 
the relationship of the self to the other, a relationship that he 
contended is innate in and to the very identity of the individual 
self. At key points in his elucidation of the other-directed self 
that is the basis of his ethical system, he contrasted it with what 
he purported to be the wholly self-interested individualism 
underlying Baruch Spinoza’s ethical system. Levinas’s 
interpretation of the Spinozan individual self is a strategic 
misreading that allowed him to highlight the profound 
differences between his conception of the self and that of 
Spinoza. However, when we consider the Spinozan self within 
the context of his own ethical system, we find that it also 
ultimately is other-directed, but in a manner quite distinct from 
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that of the Levinasian self. Considered together, the contrasting 
ethical selves of Levinas and Spinoza provide alternative models 
of existing ethically in the world, each of which appeals to a 
particular type of contemporary existential situation and need. 
Moreover, although the Levinasian concept of the self functions 
as a strategic critique of the Spinozan self, both are vitally 
opposed to the modern humanist conception of the intrinsically 
separate egoistic individual, with its proprietary rights and 
satisfactions, as a valid ontological model and worthwhile 
ethical ideal.  
Levinas highlighted his fundamental disagreement with the 
Spinozan concept of the self, as he interpreted it, in his 
explication of his own ethical system in a late-life interview in 
which he referred to the key Spinozan concept of conatus essendi 
(the effort to persist in one’s being) as being that against which 
he had developed his entire philosophy:  
In the conatus essendi, which is the effort to exist, existence is 
the supreme law…. A being is something that is attached to 
being, to its own being. That is Darwin's idea. The being of 
animals is a struggle for life. A struggle for life without 
ethics…. However, with the appearance of the human - and 
this is my entire philosophy - there is something more 
important than my life, and that is the life of the other.1 
Levinas contended that being human means that we can choose 
not to choose ourselves first, but to give the other priority over 
ourselves, which he characterized as “the valorization of 
holiness”2 over self-interestedness: 
As opposed to the interestedness of being, to its primordial 
essence which is conatus essendi, a perseverance in the face of 
everything and everyone, a persistence of being there – the 
human (love of the other, responsibility for one’s fellowman, 
                                               
1Emmanuel Levinas, “The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with 
Emmanuel Levinas,” trans., Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright, 
in The Provocation of Levinas, ed., David Wood and Robert Bernasconi, 
New York, NY: Routledge, 2014, 168-179, 175, 172. 
2Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous, trans., Michael B. Smith, New 
York, NY: Columbia UP, 2000, 229. 
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an eventual dying-for-the-other, sacrifice even as far as the 
mad thought in which dying for the other can concern me 
well before, and more than, my own death) – the human 
signifies the beginning of a new rationality beyond being. A 
rationality of the Good higher than all essence.3 
There are two key points to be noted in this passage in making 
the contrast between the Levinasian and Spinozan self. One is 
the concept of sacrificial dying-for-the-other, which Levinas 
elsewhere characterizes more generally as “substitution,”4 and 
the other is the emphasis placed on the supreme rationality of 
the transcendent Good beyond being, a concept that Levinas 
borrowed from Plato. In emphasizing both, Levinas was making 
an implicit contrast with the Spinozan model of the ethical self, 
which Levinas took to be both wholly self-interested and 
implicitly opposed to any notion of transcendence.  
In his illuminating introduction to his translation of Levinas’s 
Otherwise than Being, Alphonso Lingis elucidated the crucial role 
that the concept of substitution plays in Levinas’s ethical system: 
For Levinas substitution is the ethical itself; responsibility is 
putting oneself in place of another. Through becoming 
interchangeable with anyone, I take on the weight and 
consistency of one that bears the burden of being, of alien 
being and of the world. I become substantial and a subject, 
subjected to the world and to the others. And because in this 
putting myself in the place of another I am imperiously 
summoned, singled out, through it I accede to singularity.5  
For Levinas, the self in its singular subjectivity comes into being 
only by dint of its sacrificial relation to the other, a relation that 
Levinas considers is implicit in the very nature of language, 
which is fundamentally and primarily a beseeching and 
responsive communication with the other, and only secondarily 
and incidentally an expression of one’s egoistic individuality.6 A 
                                               
3Levinas, Entre Nous, 229. 
4Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans., 
Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne UP, 1998, 124. 
5Levinas, Otherwise than Being, xxix. 
6Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 143. 
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wholly autonomous expressive self, according to Levinas, is a 
fictive fantasy of humanist egoists and idealists. As existential 
beings, we can choose to acknowledge or to deny the obligation 
to the other that is innate in the self’s very identity as a self, and 
in this choice we are in effect choosing either to be human, by 
acceding to a higher rationality that attests through self-sacrifice 
to the Good beyond being, or to be subhuman and animalistic in 
our wholly self-interested drive toward individual thriving in 
our essential being.  
In making his argument for the other-directed self, Levinas 
was attempting to address the nihilism he felt to be the greatest 
temptation and threat to being ethically human in the 
contemporary world. When we take as an existential goal and 
model the egoistic individual in its self-interested thriving, we 
come face to face with the absurdity of death, to which every 
individual – no matter how successful in its existence – 
ultimately is delivered. When we consider, however, that the self 
is by its very nature obliged to the other in an infinite 
responsibility that is the singling out that the Good has conferred 
upon each of us in our being brought into the mortal world, we 
are given an existential task and purpose – that of sacrificially 
substituting ourselves for the other in pursuit of an ultimate 
justice for one and all in testimony to the Good beyond being – 
that supersedes our thriving as essential individual egos: 
Substitution frees the subject from ennui, that is, from the 
enchainment to itself, where the ego suffocates in itself due to 
the tautological way of identity, and ceaselessly seeks after 
the distraction of games and sleep in a movement that never 
wears out…. No one is so hypocritical as to claim that he has 
taken from death its sting, not even the promises of religions. 
But we can have the responsibilities and attachments through 
which death takes on a meaning. That is because, from the 
start, the other affects us despite ourselves.7  
For Levinas, the encounter with the “face” of the other, in its 
absolute alterity, is a kind of divine grace that we are granted 
                                               
7Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 124, 129. 
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which frees us from the entrapment of a wholly self-interested 
egoistic individualism and the absurdity of its death, an egoistic 
existence which he identifies with Spinoza’s metaphysical 
system and its intrinsically unethical (for Levinas) acceptance 
and endorsement of the necessity and truth of being: “Being is 
play or détente, without responsibility, where everything 
possible is permitted.”8 Levinas’s entire philosophy is 
marshalled against acceding to the necessity of such a system. As 
Richard Cohen recently commented in contrasting Spinoza’s 
valorisation of the truth of being with Levinas’s valorisation of 
the Good beyond being: “Spinoza exalts indeed idolizes the true, 
the true without the good, science as a substitute for ethics; 
Levinas exalts the good, the good above truth but requiring 
truth, truth serving justice; and I, I am with Levinas, for this is a 
debate without neutral spectators as it is a debate without exit or 
escape.”9 Put in these terms, Cohen’s preference for Levinas 
seems inevitable and just. 
But is the Spinozan self as depicted and critiqued by Levinas 
and denigrated by Cohen, a self wholly enmeshed and expressed 
in amoral being, the authentic self of Spinoza’s ethical system? I 
would argue that it is not. To understand why it is not, let us 
return to the key concept of conatus essendi in Spinoza’s original 
usage of it: “Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to 
persist in its own being…. The endeavor, wherewith everything 
endeavors to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the 
actual essence of the thing in question.”10 In Levinas’s reading of 
Spinoza, the self selfishly chooses to persist in its own being in 
lieu of substituting itself sacrificially for the other in testament to 
the Good beyond being. But Spinoza’s system is predicated on 
the assumption that we have no choice when it comes to the 
endeavour to persist in our “actual essence,” which is a 
particular and necessary expression of the ultimate reality that is 
                                               
8Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 6. 
9Richard Cohen, Out of Control: Confrontations between Spinoza and 
Levinas, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2016, xviii. 
10Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans., G. H. R. Parkinson, Oxford, UK: 
Oxford UP, 2000, 136. 
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God, who alone is “self-determining, active, and free.”11 We are 
not free to choose whether or not to persist in our own 
individual nature or essence, but only to choose whether or not 
to express positively and well that nature. As Stuart Hampshire 
commented in his clarifying study, for the Spinozan individual 
self, “In the last analysis, and speaking philosophically, there is 
no such choice of an ideal or end. Philosophically speaking, the 
choice is of the right means to an end that is already determined 
for him by his nature and appetites as an individual thinking 
and physical thing.”12 For Spinoza, to assume that we can choose 
whether or not to persist in our own individual nature, in our 
“natural essence,” is as absurd as assuming that a lion could 
choose to be a lamb if it wanted to, and it is the persistent belief 
in and illusion of such a choice that contributes to making 
human beings miserable in the world. Rather, the wisdom of life 
in Spinoza’s system is to focus all of our powers on 
understanding and actively fulfilling positively and well our 
necessary and given individual natures. If we choose to deny our 
essential nature, we do not alter it in the least, as it is necessary, 
but we sacrifice our power actively to express and understand 
that nature.  
This task of endeavouring to understand and actively express 
our nature may seem to be a wholly self-interested and even 
solipsistic behaviour, but according to Spinoza, it is the very 
basis of ethical human sociality, as “the man who is ignorant of 
himself is ignorant of the basis of all virtues, and consequently is 
ignorant of all virtues.”13 Moreover, “The highest good of those 
who follow virtue is common to all, and all can enjoy it 
equally.”14 Virtue is a key term for Spinoza that refers to the 
power of successful expression of one’s individual and essential 
nature. “Virtue is human power itself, which is defined by the 
essence of man alone… which is defined solely by the endeavor 
                                               
11Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, Oxford, UK: Clarendon 
Press, 2005, 184. 
12Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, 184. 
13Spinoza, Ethics, 266. 
14Spinoza, Ethics, 251. 
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by which a man endeavors to persevere in his being.”15 So, in 
Spinoza’s system, virtue and the effort to persist in our 
individual nature, conatus essendi, are in effect one and the same. 
This layered and complex understanding of conatus essendi is in 
distinct contrast with Levinas’s strategic interpretation of the 
concept as being a Darwinian struggle for the self at the expense 
of others. Indeed, Spinoza’s emphasis on the positive nature of 
power as properly understood and expressed may well seem 
naïve in a world full of manipulative users and abusers, but it is 
his faith in the positive powers that are potential in human 
nature that is his particular gift to a sceptical and cynical 
contemporary world, as Gilles Deleuze commented, “In a world 
consumed by the negative, [Spinoza] has enough confidence in 
life, in the power of life, to challenge death, the murderous 
appetite of men, the rules of good and evil, of the just and the 
unjust. Enough confidence in life to denounce all the phantoms 
of the negative.”16 
Once we have achieved individual virtue by coming to 
understand the implicit reason of our own nature, which is 
always by necessity a relative achievement, as only God has full 
power of understanding and expression of his nature, we can 
use our hard-won understanding to enlighten others, “Since we 
know of no particular thing that is more excellent than a man 
who is led by reason, each person can give no greater display of 
the power of his skill and ingenuity than in educating men in 
such a way that they finally live in accordance with their own 
rule of reason.”17 In contrast with Levinas, for whom the 
essential existential task of the self is to substitute itself 
sacrificially for the other in the manner of a holy saint, Spinoza 
posits the enlightened self as a sagacious role model, teacher, 
and guide to the unenlightened. Indeed the self that has 
achieved a degree of freedom by dint of its self-understanding is 
obliged by the shared social instinct of human nature to help 
                                               
15Spinoza, Ethics, 241. 
16Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans., Robert Hurley, 
San Francisco, Ca: City Lights Books, 2001, 13. 
17Spinoza, Ethics, 282. 
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others to the achievement of their own liberation, for “Freedom 
does not remove the necessity of action, but imposes it.”18 Thus 
Spinoza’s model of the ethical self ultimately is other-directed, 
like that of Levinas, but in a strikingly different manner, in 
which we each are obliged according to the degree of our own 
self-liberation to assist our neighbours out of their own bondage 
to hatred of self and other. Steven Nadler recently noted the 
earnest effort at liberation that is the passionate argument 
implicit in Spinoza’s thought system: “If there is one theme that 
runs throughout all of Spinoza’s writings, it is the liberation 
from bondage, whether psychological, political, or religious.”19 
Antonio Negri likewise commented upon the revolutionary 
social potential of the Spinozan system of individual liberation 
through self-acceptance and understanding that ultimately and 
inevitably produces an other-directed “love” that “rips us free of 
solitude and permits us to construct the world together.”20  
Although it seems to me necessary to press back against 
Levinas’s strategic misreading of Spinoza in order to appreciate 
the nature of Spinoza’s ethical self in its relation to the other on 
its own terms, unlike Cohen, I am not interested in choosing 
between the ethical systems of the two philosophers or in using 
one to denigrate the other, for both are of great value and use in 
the contemporary world. The model of Levinas’s other-directed 
self with its existential task of sacrificial substitution speaks to 
those who are exhausted by and disgusted with an existence the 
only purpose of which is self-satisfaction and the ultimate end of 
which is the absurdity of one’s wholly individual death, whereas 
Spinoza’s model of the liberated self speaks to those who feel 
oppressed by a world that does not accept their nature and to 
those who have allowed the lesser gods of their nature to put 
their reason in bondage to their emotions. When I briefly 
                                               
18Spinoza, Complete Works, trans., Samuel Shirley, ed. Michael 
Morgan, Indianapolis, In: Hackett, 2002, 686. 
19Steven Nadler, A Book Forged in Hell: Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise 
and the Birth of the Secular Age, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2011, 32. 
20Antonio Negri, Spinoza for our Time: Politics and Postmodernity,” 
New York, NY: Columbia UP, 2013, 17. 
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summarized the two ethical systems for a friend recently, he 
responded, “I see, Levinas is good for the depressed and Spinoza 
for the oppressed,” which is well put. Moreover, both systems 
offer crucially alternative models to the dominant humanist 
understanding and valorisation of the individual as a self-
sustaining autonomous ego with proprietary rights and 
satisfactions. In their critique of the idolatry of the thriving, 
satisfied egoistic self as an ethical model and existential ideal, 
Levinas and Spinoza each offer a postmodern and posthumanist 
way forward into a future in which the self’s egoistic 
individuality is diminished in favour of a meaningful purpose 
within and connectedness to a greater and ultimate reality that 
Levinas refers to as the Good beyond being and Spinoza 
famously described as, “sub specie aeternitatis,”21 the perspective 
of the eternal.  
In making their arguments against the modern idol of the 
freely independent individual actor, the valorisation of which 
Spinoza’s early-modern philosophy prophetically anticipated,22 
both philosophers questioned the value of individual freedom, 
egoistically understood, as an end in itself. As Levinas noted in 
his comments on the story of the biblical character of Job:  
We have been accustomed to reason in the name of the 
freedom of the ego – as though I had witnessed the creation 
of the world, and as though I could only have been in charge 
of a world that would have issued out of my free will…. To 
be responsible over and beyond one’s freedom is certainly 
not to remain a pure result of the world. To support the 
universe is a crushing charge, but a divine discomfort. It is 
better than the merits and faults and sanctions proportionate 
to the freedom of one’s choices.23  
Levinas continued by arguing that modern humanism, which 
considers the freedom and satisfaction of the individual to be an 
end in itself, without reference, connection, or obligation to the 
other, “has to be denounced only because it is not sufficiently 
                                               
21Spinoza, Ethics, 306. 
22Negri, Spinoza for our Time, 18. 
23Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 122. 
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human.”24 Spinoza’s determinist system likewise critiques the 
presumptions of a wholly free and independent individual actor, 
“There is in the mind no absolute, i.e., no free, will, but the mind 
is determined to will this or that by a cause, which is again 
determined by another, and that again by another, and so on to 
infinity.”25 The individual’s freedom lies in his choice to assent 
to, endorse, and understand his nature or not, and to realize it as 
a small but unique part of a greater whole, which is to conceive 
things “under a species of eternity.”26 As Hampshire 
commented: “To Spinoza it seemed that men can attain 
happiness and dignity only by identifying themselves, through 
their knowledge and understanding, with the whole order of 
nature, and by submerging their individual interests in this 
understanding.”27 Although Spinoza’s understanding assent, in 
its “Stoic… wisdom of resignation and sublimation,”28 and 
Levinas’s sacrificial substitution, in its saintly ideal of holiness, 
are ethical ideals that are temperamentally distinct and perhaps 
in natural and necessary systemic opposition, they are similar in 
their conception of life as an existential task in the service of a 
greater reality that gives dignity and purpose to each individual 
mortal being. Despite his career-long phenomenologist’s 
opposition to Spinoza’s Stoic, determinist metaphysics, Levinas 
recognized that both systems, in their supreme instances, are in 
service to the same ultimate, unencapsulable Good: “Philosophy 
has, at its highest, exceptional hours stated the beyond of being 
and the one distinct from being…. Here we have the boldness to 
think that even the Stoic nobility of resignation to the logos 
already owes its energy to the openness to the beyond 
essence.”29 
                                               
24Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 128. 
25Spinoza, Ethics, 155. 
26Spinoza, Ethics, 307. 
27Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, 123. 
28Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 176. 
29Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 178. 
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Abstract: In a closer scrutiny, discussions on the self, identity, 
and the other take an epistemological turn in Aquinas and 
Wittgenstein. Both of them leave ample space for it 
notwithstanding their ontological and linguistic philosophies, 
respectively. The epistemology that can be drawn from them 
does not limit itself to the ‘process of knowledge’, rather moves 
beyond the synthesis of knowledge to the integration of life and 
actions. The dichotomy between ‘self’ and the ‘other’ and the 
‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ are overcome with the relational 
epistemology. Systemic epistemology is transformed to 
relational epistemology where relationality of knowing, acting, 
and being constitute a linguistic community. Human persons as 
the members of this community play distinct roles in the human 
world where other beings also exist. 
Keywords: Identity, Individual, Inner and Outer, Intellect, Inter-
reflection, Knowledge, Language-games, Other, Relationality, 
Seeing as, Self, Soul/Mind. 
1. Introduction 
Aquinas discusses ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’ from 
epistemological and ontological points of view. Wittgenstein 
addresses the issue from a linguistic point of view, whose 
discussions on ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ are compatible to the 
discussions on ‘identity’ and the ‘other’. Despite the similarities 
and differences in their accounts because of the particular 
contextual standpoints from which they address the issue, the 
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questions of ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’ are moving towards a 
horizon where Aquinas and Wittgenstein meet each other. 
Aquinas’ treatment of human knowledge and Wittgenstein’s 
taste for language games constitute the horizon; the relationality 
becomes the horizon of identity and otherness. Given the mode 
of the understanding of ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’ from a 
contemporary analysis of person as an individual with freedom, 
and the ‘other’ as the ‘outer’ which also has an ‘inner’, it is 
proposed that the concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘other’ are 
compatible with the analysis of Aquinas and Wittgenstein on 
‘person’, and that can even go beyond their understanding of 
these concepts. The flexibility in interpreting the concepts, 
against common rigid considerations (those of rationalism, 
empiricism, or scepticism), allows an expansion of horizons 
based on particular interpretation that I undertake here.  
We begin with Aquinas’ understanding of self, identity, and 
otherness, and interpret that these are not compartmentalised 
but are mutually enriching concepts. Secondly, an investigation 
into Wittgenstein’s concepts of self and other is undertaken, and 
it can be proposed that these concepts cannot escape the 
labyrinth of language-games but are rooted in them. Finally, it is 
proposed that while Aquinas and Wittgenstein follow different 
methodologies with a similar purpose of addressing the 
philosophical problems concerning human life, they can find 
ways of interacting, and the encounter with their ideas in the 
present can be an antidote to unidirectional methods in 
epistemology, especially with regard to the knowledge of self 
and the other, that isolate individual and the other. The solution 
to the problems of ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’ are relational since 
‘self’, ‘identity’, and ‘otherness’ are relational concepts of a 
human person in a human world. The questions are primarily 
approached from an epistemological point of view though they 
can also be discussed from ontological perspective. The 
epistemological project is undertaken here due to the 
methodological realisation that unless the logic of being (identity 
and otherness) is clarified, the ontology of being is 
incomprehensible. Epistemology and ontology are two sides of 
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one coin, but epistemology takes precedence in the order of 
knowledge, and ontology takes precedence in the order of being. 
Being is most fundamental notion which also includes 
knowledge, but knowing ‘being’ comes prior to the ontology of 
being.1 The ontology of ‘identity’ and ‘other’ is to be analysed 
separately in another project. There are many related 
epistemological, ontological, and anthropological questions that 
are mentioned but not engaged with, in order to confine the 
scope of this article to the epistemological perspective of self, 
identity, and otherness. 
2. Aquinas’ Way of Gauging the Certainty of “I” through 
“Identity” 
An epistemological question that comes alive while discussing 
on ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’ is how does one know that 
something exists and continue to exist the way something is? 
‘Something’ is a generic term which includes both material and 
personal existence. The concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’ 
primarily refer to the personal existence and secondarily to 
material existence of things; since the ‘other’ also includes 
material things. Another related question is whether there is any 
relation between one’s existence and that of the other. In this 
section we shall address the question by placing it in the 
mediaeval context and then moving onto a Thomistic response. 
One could find intense analysis of personal identity in the 
writings of Aquinas in discussing about the principle of 
individuation, the doctrine of resurrection, and the Divine 
nature and the Divine Persons. The scope of this article excludes 
the latter questions because it needs a separate treatment of the 
kind of ‘personal identity and the otherness’ of the Divine 
Persons, and considers only the principle of individuation. The 
personal identity of the Divine persons refer to the hypostasis 
                                               
1It is not endorsing Cartesian cogito ergo sum, which can be 
translated both as ‘I think therefore I exist’ or ‘I exist therefore I think’, 
instead, it is proposed that ontologically ‘being’ (that a thing is) comes 
first and ‘logically’ knowledge of ‘what a thing’ (nature of a being) 
comes first, than ‘that a thing’ (existence of a being). 
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(the way each Divine Person possessing the Divine nature) of 
each Person to the Divine nature. The principle of individuation 
is primarily attributed to matter in material things, and in 
human persons (i.e., composed of material and immaterial), 
personality. 
For Medieval philosophers, in general, the question of the 
certainty of ‘I’ is through the question of personal identity and 
individuation. William of Ockham rejected any universal notion 
of the person and proposed ‘numerical’ individuation.2 Duns 
Scotus proposed haecceitas or ‘thisness’ as the principle of 
individuation3 as opposed to what Aquinas suggested, matter as 
the principle of individuation. In fact, Aquinas suggested matter 
as that which individuates a form, distinguishing it from another 
form, and both matter and form together individuates a being.4 
To say something as ‘this person’ one needs to affirm the reality 
of the whole person. When we look at a human being, it can be 
considered (a popular perception) that human person is the 
combination of ‘human body’ which is the material appearance 
of a human being, and ‘human soul’, which is considered as that 
                                               
2Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol. III, New York: 
Newman Press, 1993, 49. See also, Peter King, “Duns Scotus on the 
Common Nature and the Individual Differentia”, Philosophical Topics, 
no. 20 (Fall 1992), 50-76. In this article, Peter King analyses the criticism 
of Duns Scotus on William of Ockham's numerical identity. 
3John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, II. d. 3; qq, 5-6, n.177, Vatican: Studio 
Et Cura Commissionis Scotisticae, 2005. 
4See, Christopher Hughes, “Matter and Actuality”, in Thomas 
Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed., Brian Davies, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 61-72. The controversy whether 
the matter alone is the principle of individuation or whether it is 
matter and form together (which seems to be the position held by 
Bonaventure) is never sorted out among Thomistic scholars. Given the 
possibility of ontological recognition of a ‘being’ where ‘form’ is 
dominant, one might hold for the ‘matter-form togetherness’ view of 
individuation, than the ‘matter alone’ view. In the case of human 
persons, the identity is referred to the quantified matter as other 
material beings and substantial form (human soul) as other immaterial 
beings. 
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principle which makes the material composition alive and makes 
it act like a human person. The identity of a human being lies 
precisely in the way it acts with an appearance which is 
accepted. The relevance of the concept of the individuation lies 
in situating the human person as a unique entity in the world. 
Personal identity does not cease with the question of the 
principle of individuation rather it persists in the question of the 
continuity of the ‘thisness’ or individual person over time. 
Therefore, the scope of the puzzle is to understand the 
dynamism of identity and otherness; what makes a thing what it 
is, what makes a thing the kind of thing that it is, what makes a 
thing similar to other things of the kind, what makes a thing 
different from the similar things of the kind, and what makes the 
thing different from all other things of different kinds. The scope 
of the question of ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’ is diverged and 
merged in these questions.5  
The concept ‘identity’ has various nuances in philosophy. It 
could be the result of ‘identifying’ something with something 
else, or ‘comparison’ of something to another, or more broadly 
attributing sameness to something over a period of time though 
it undergoes some accidental changes, either internal or external. 
In the case of human person the question can be narrowed down 
to the ‘sameness of self’ that endures through the passage of 
time. In the case of material beings, the sameness of ‘thingness’ is 
the principle of identity. The identification of one’s self itself is 
an interesting scheme in Aquinas’ account. There are 
philosophical positions that attempt to see the knowledge of the 
self as immediate or direct (as in the case of Cartesian self) and 
the self in turn opens itself to the external world through the 
concept of friendship.6 This way of looking at the self reflects 
                                               
5These questions are analysed by Peter King, “The Problem of 
Individuation in the Middle Ages”, Theoria 66, no. 2 (August 2000): 
159–184. 
6For a detailed account of this position see, Mark K. Spencer, 
“Aristotelian Substance and Personalistic Subjectivity”, International 
Philosophical Quarterly 55, no. 2 (June 2015):145-164. Various positions 
on ‘subjectivity’ is examined in this article, and the author takes a 
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‘interactionism’ - the Cartesian solution to the problem of radical 
dualism of mind/self and body (soul and body/world and 
spirit, material and immaterial). An alternative view can be 
accorded to this position that the self cannot be known 
immediately but mediately. To ask, whether the question of ‘I’ is 
theoretically explained in the writings of Aquinas is to ask 
whether the obvious is put in words. Being a realist, Aquinas 
would never have any doubt about one’s own existence. 
Commenting on a passage from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book 
VII, no. 17, he indicates the position: “And by the same 
reasoning, when one asks ‘What is man?’ it must be evident that 
man exists. But this could not happen if one were to ask why a 
thing is itself, for example, ‘Why is man man?’ or ‘Why is the 
musical musical?’ for in knowing that a man is a man it is known 
why he is a man.”7 Aquinas takes the knowledge of a human 
being as something self-evident, as commented by Robert 
Pasnau, “Three-dimensional bodies are similarly manifest in our 
everyday experiences; there is nothing mysterious there.”8 
Human beings are also three-dimensional bodies but with 
specific difference of rationality. We focus on the knowledge of 
the self primarily though the ‘other’ includes all beings both 
material and immaterial. To ask whether ‘oneself exists’ or not, 
was a nonsensical question since the knowledge was self-evident 
or of a realist kind. He further indicates that only a human 
person has the particular certainty in this particular way. To 
understand the logic of this position, one needs to have a holistic 
view of the process of self-knowledge in Aquinas. The 
knowledge of the ‘self’ is a result of cognition with its upward 
(inductive) and downward (deductive) movements. We grasp 
the universal through induction and the particular is grasped in 
                                               
stand that the subjectivity is both irreducible and personal but opens 
itself to the outer world. 
7Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Metaphysics, trans. John P. 
Rowan, ed. Joseph Kenny, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961, 
no. 1651. 
8Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004, 28.  
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relation to the universal. These are not separate movements but 
one movement with two processes. “We can grasp things only in 
as much as they exist in such and such ways…”9 The process of 
knowledge is aimed at ‘what is the case’ than ‘what ought to be 
the case’ or ‘what was the case’. The dynamism that asserts the 
certainty of oneself is the cogitative power which can be 
considered as the ‘boundary’ between the ‘sensory’ and 
‘intellectual powers’. I consider cogitative power as a boundary 
between intellect and senses, after the analogy of Aquinas who 
considers human soul exists “... on the confines of spiritual and 
corporeal” (ST, I, 77, 2). The cogitative power can have access to 
both the sensation and the abilities of intellect, just like human 
soul can know both material and immaterial reality. Contrary to 
the scepticism of David Hume who validates only ‘impressions’ 
(pure sensations) as source of knowledge, it is to be affirmed that 
for a human person, the scope of pure sensation is not possible, 
but a sensation as a human person is possible. To illustrate this, a 
contrast of human pain and dog’s pain can be used. The pain of 
a dog and the pain of a human being after hitting with a stone 
are ontologically different. The pain in the latter case is also 
sensation but not a pure sensation, since every experience of a 
human person is sensitive-intellectual/rational. The role of the 
senses in a human being is to be qualified to complement 
his/her rational capacities. While the intellect is able to 
apprehend an individual as existing under a common nature, the 
senses always grasp the particular qualities. Intellect abstracts 
human nature from many human beings and conceptualises it 
(upward movement), and what is conceptualised is attributed to 
the individual instances (downward movement). The sensitive 
knowledge permeates through the intellectual knowledge and 
the intellectual knowledge influences the sensitive knowledge. 
That is why ‘pure’ idea and ‘pure’ sensation is impossible. The 
movement of sensible species to the intellect, and the intellectual 
                                               
9Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica Part I, Question 15 Article 
3, [Henceforth ST, I, Q., a.,] trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, ed. Sandra K. Perry and Joseph Kenny, Oxford: Benziger 
Bros. Edition, 1947.  
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powers to sensation is facilitated by cogitative power that 
enables the recognition of this human being as ‘this human 
being’ and not another. To conceive the dynamism of cogitative 
power other analogies can be used: Consider the first two 
human beings in the primitive world. How did they recognise 
that they are similar to each other as ‘human beings’ (though 
names did not matter then), but distinct from all other things in 
their experience? This simple and unqualified understanding is 
due to what is called ‘cogitative’ power. Universal notion of 
‘man’ comes with inductive reasoning where many human 
beings are involved. The case here is of only the first two 
primitive human beings. Secondly, the principle of non-
contradiction and identity also indicate that the first moment of 
knowing ‘A is A’, and ‘A is not B’ come with the cogitative 
power. The knowledge begins here and moves with great 
intensity to the higher specification with the work of the 
intellect. This knowledge stands midway between 
conceptualisation and imagination. While senses recognise the 
sensible species and the intellect perceives the intelligible 
species; cogitative power does not reason or sense, it simply 
understands the things as they are.10 The sort of self-knowledge 
is advanced thus: one’s existence and nature is not to be proved 
by reasoning but by recognition of one’s capacities as 
corresponding to one’s activities in the world. No one has to 
ostensively teach me that ‘I’ am a human being. Sensing, 
thinking, acting, and living are various capacities manifested by 
things that have senses, intellect, faculties or powers, and the 
principle of life or soul, and these capacities and faculties are 
expressed in the person’s life and actions. Various operations of 
a human person point out that the self exists in such and such 
ways.11 It is self-evident, and need not be proved at all. An 
                                               
10It is to be noted that the cogitative power does not act 
independently of intellect and senses which is impossible, but 
cogitative power is a unique power of human person, which is akin to 
estimative power in animals. 
11For a detailed description of the operations of senses, intellect, 
cogitative, and estimative powers, see, Thomas Aquinas, Commentary 
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animal too may have consciousness, that it exists such and such 
ways and fulfils its wants, though it may not be aware of the 
details of its operations. It has the estimative power which is the 
highest form of knowledge of its kind, and human person has it 
as cogitative power that is influenced by the intellectual and 
sensitive powers (ST, Q.74,4 ). 
Given the kind of realism proposed here, can someone ask, 
how do I know ‘I’ am the same person who lived and acted as 
human being a few years ago, and yet existing and acting even 
now? It is a question on ‘self-identity’ need not to be proved at 
all.12 The relevant question is whether ‘I exist’ and not whether ‘I 
was existing’ or ‘I will exist’. Another question is whether ‘I’ 
who exists is identical with other human beings. The answer 
along the thought of Aquinas is that there is no immediate 
apprehension of self by itself rather in understanding the things 
around, it understands itself – mediately. All that has been said 
about the self-knowledge and self-identity, with the analogy of 
cogitative power, is in fact a mediate knowledge, but a certain 
knowledge since it is self that knows knows itself mediately. 
Thus the argument that self can only be known through external 
world is endorsed by the Thomistic line of thought. This is in 
sharp contrast to what Descartes proposed as Archimedean 
point in certainty: ‘cogito ergo sum’;13 I think therefore I am. 
                                               
on Aristotle’s De Anima, trans. Kevin White, ed. Joseph Kenny, 
Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 2005, Lectio 12 
and 13: nos. 373-396. See also, Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human 
Nature, 275 and 337. 
12The study, so far, has not been aimed at proving the existence of 
self, but explaining the facts of one’s existence as an existing self. 
13For discussions on cogito, see, Rene Descartes, Meditations on First 
Philosophy, 2nd Meditation no.7, trans. John Cottingham, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. The question, “what is a human 
being?” is framed from a deductive regression after Cartesian model of 
cogito. The cogito is an answer to all possible agnosticism around the 
world, human being, and God, and the certainty of one’s self is the 
paradigm for all other certainties. This deductive conclusion on human 
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Consequently, for Descartes, by knowing oneself, mind knows 
all things which undermines the knowledge of others from the 
point of view of themselves, but depends completely on the 
knowledge of the self. The Cartesian cogito thinks itself and at its 
leisure knows other things, and as a result the world may or may 
not exist if it does not think about them.  
3. Dynamic Turn: From “I” and “Identity” to the “Other” 
Progressing on from the previous section, in order to understand 
the identity of oneself better, the existence and identity of others 
are also proposed. A simple analysis of the text from Aquinas on 
Truth would do the same. “Hence, our mind cannot so 
understand itself that it immediately apprehends itself. Rather, it 
comes to the knowledge of itself through apprehension of other 
things …”14 On the one hand, the mind grasps the universal 
nature of all things, and the individual nature of a particular 
thing through the universal nature. On the other hand, 
‘cogitation’ occurs before intellect grasps the universal nature. 
The cogitative certainty is that enables the intellect to grasp it as 
a human being under universal and particular nature. Thus, 
cogitative certainty is a certainty of a particular kind unlike 
intellection, imagination and sensation. These processes, are 
finally ‘one’ act, under different aspects. Positively speaking, the 
self is able to know all things by grasping their natures through 
‘awareness’. It is a journey of the self ‘inside out’ and ‘outside 
in’: a kind of ‘inter-reflection’; the self, by reflecting on the 
objects arrive at self-knowledge. In knowing, mind has no 
internal dynamism (i.e., innate ideas) to know the things around. 
It knows all things through the intelligible species presented to 
itself. The intelligible species are abstracted from the particular 
sensible species or phantasm, which in turn owe their existence 
to the real things existing around. It is clear on this account that 
                                               
being as a ‘thinking self’ fails to answer at the same token the presence 
of the other in the world.  
14Thomas Aquinas, On Truth, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, James W. 
McGlynn and Robert W. Schmidt, 3 vols, ed. Joseph Kenny, Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, Question 10, Article 8. 
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the powers of the mind or soul (i.e., memory, intellect, and will) 
are active only on account of the external things. In other words, 
the conformity of the mind to the external things increases the 
scope of the mind to know itself. 
From what has been said, we arrive at a seemingly conflicting 
account of self-knowledge. The ‘self’ knows itself through 
identifying its own acts through cogitative power; what could be 
the rationale of stating that the mind or self knows itself by 
knowing the other things? At this juncture, there is no conflict 
except in the variants of understanding. When it is said that the 
mind knows itself through the cogitative power, it implies that 
the cogitative power has no individual and unrelated mode of 
knowing the self, it knows by the help of both sensible and 
intelligible species (as seen above). The cogitative power of 
knowing the self, though not conditioned by intellection, is not 
direct but indirect by means of intelligible species and sensible 
species. Through reasoning self is to know all things: the fruits of 
intellection, i.e., universal concepts, and in knowing these, mind 
increases its scope of knowing its modes of operation. The direct 
apprehension of the self or what we call Cartesian ‘I’ is to know 
itself without the help of anything. This way of self-knowledge is 
untenable from a realist point of view. The self-knowledge is a 
combination of all three or in more direct way, these are three 
ways of understanding one knowledge of the self. Going further, 
it can be proposed that, through ‘reasoning’ human persons not 
only know things but also the self and the other better. The term 
‘reasoning’ needs to be qualified as a fitting term in this process 
than the term ‘intellection’. The word ‘intellection’ somehow 
indicates the primacy of intellect in knowing. The word 
‘reasoning’ is a broader term, which indicates the proper 
assignation of various faculties in knowing, including that of the 
‘intellect’. It is to be emphasised that self does not know itself 
from a universal category (as it is the scope of intellection), but 
knows itself as self-evident and existing, experiencing, and 
knowing here and now with the knowledge of other things. 
There is, then, no one solution to the problem of identity since 
the problem includes both ‘sameness’ (‘I’) and the ‘otherness’. 
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Since the knowledge of the self is related to sensible species, 
intelligible species, cognition, cogitation, and sensation, the 
knowledge itself is relational. The knowledge of the self is 
indirect or relational, and the relational is always ‘other-
oriented’. 
Another distinct question that is related to the question of 
identity and otherness is the knowledge of others as immaterial 
beings or beings with minds. Aquinas in his discussion on Truth 
gives a remote argument for the knowledge of a being as an 
immaterial being.15 This is a question related to the knowledge 
of angels and God. We have seen that the self-knowledge 
depends on the relational way. This in fact is the ‘first person’ 
knowledge about one’s own self through reflecting on the 
external things. This type of knowledge never gives a clue to the 
understanding of other people’s thoughts and minds. For 
Aquinas, the knowledge of other people’s minds was not a 
problem as he would envisage any human person with normal 
thinking and rational ability would be able to think the kind of 
thoughts any human person would have. This position is to be 
examined in the light of language use and the actions of human 
persons. 
Given the dynamism of language where speaker (subject), 
receiver (term), and the spoken word (foundation) are related, 
we could propose that use of language itself is an indication of 
how others think. It could be demonstrated that the use of 
language by other beings would eventually prove the movement 
from premises to conclusion which can be recognised by others. 
For, e.g., when one says, “It is quite cold here, therefore I need 
                                               
15Aquinas, On Truth, Question 10, Article 11: “ … by means of the 
natural knowledge, which we experience in this life, our mind cannot 
see either God or angels through their essence. Nevertheless, angels 
can be seen through their essence by means of intelligible species 
different from their essence, but the divine essence cannot, for it 
transcends every genus and is outside every genus.” The scope of the 
knowledge of immaterial beings is to be treated specially, and 
therefore, we shall restrict the article to the knowledge of human 
beings as intellectual/rational beings. 
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warm cloths” it would communicate to others who are 
acquainted with English language what the first person has been 
thinking. Coming to the broader side of language, one could 
even argue that thoughts are revealed in the linguistic practice of 
the human beings where ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’ are 
interrelated; ‘I’ recognise others’ minds through language and 
activities proper to the human persons. Just like knowledge of 
self, escapes ‘solipsism’ through the relational process of 
sensation, imagination, cogitation, and intellection (all this can 
be summarised into ‘reasoning’ in a broad sense), the knowledge 
of the other minds/thoughts escapes ‘private language’ through 
expressions like behaviour, language, communication, and 
thought-acts. Seen the whole process of knowledge of the self 
and the other in this way, we can further propose that 
Wittgenstein’s language-games and linguistic practices 
complement the Aquinas’ process of knowing the self and the 
other. 
4. ‘Identity’ and ‘Otherness’ through ‘Language-Games’ 
In any of his available writings, we have no evidence of 
Wittgenstein being sceptical about the existence of the self. Nor 
is it found that he gives argument for the existence of oneself. To 
those who ask for the evidence of the self, Wittgenstein might 
reply that it is open to the view. In one of the passages in 
Philosophical Investigations, we have this realistic turn, “…It can't 
be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in 
pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in 
pain…?”16 Further, he suggests that, “This dispute is so like the 
one between realism and idealism in that it will soon have 
become obsolete, for example, and in that both parties make 
unjust assertions at variance with their day-to-day practice.” 
(RFM 293).17 According to him, “Not empiricism and yet realism 
                                               
16Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958, no. 246; Henceforth PI. 
17Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 
eds. G. H. Von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. 
M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978; henceforth RFM. 
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in philosophy, that is the hardest thing” (RFM 325) Without 
complicating the argument, it can be said that to add ‘knowing’ 
to one’s own experience and to express it in words, ‘I know I am 
in pain’ are nonsensical in themselves, since it might suggest that 
the ‘knowing self’ and the ‘paining self’ are two entities. To my 
mind, Wittgenstein does not want to prove/know something 
more certain than something self-evident. From a similar 
argument it can be asserted that to say, “I know I exist” is a 
nonsensical proposition. Knowing and existing are two modes of 
‘one existing’ being but one act which does not need a proof. The 
existence of ‘I’ is beyond knowledge and beyond arguments: ‘I’ 
is simply there with all its knowledge and experiences. Thus, 
first person narratives (of knowledge) about oneself, one’s 
experiences, and scepticism and arguments on the contents of 
the mind are unnecessary and illogical.18 One does not have to 
introspect, device a criterion, or constitute a methodology to 
know oneself. There is no need to take a long journey into the 
self but the self is simply open to the view. The derivative 
question on the identity of ‘I’ is also to be dealt in a similar way. 
There is nothing that makes me to be sceptical about my past 
‘existence’ as ‘I’ than my certainty of the present ‘I’. The present 
‘I’ is more than enough to affirm my identity: a living human 
being is more than a witness to itself. 
The certainty of the existence of others is also not to be 
inducted or deducted from anything else, though it needs a 
special treatment. The arguments against the private ‘I’ itself 
would provide the grounds for the certainty of others. For 
Wittgenstein, the existence of others are also as certain and self-
evident like the certainty of ‘I’, because of a creative attitude. 
“My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not 
of the opinion that he has a soul” (PI 178).19 I use the phrase 
                                               
18It does not mean that all first person narratives are illogical but 
those referring to the knowledge of oneself or knowledge of one’s 
experiences.  
19The term soul used by Wittgenstein may not have the ontological 
character as Aquinas taught; however, Wittgenstein too uses this 
concept to indicate the principle of operation in human life. 
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‘creative attitude’ to distinguish between the knowledge of 
‘others’ as human beings, and the knowledge of other things. 
The attitude is creative that unlike the knowledge of other things 
which is self-evident (like the knowledge of a ‘stone’ as stone’ 
and nothing beyond itself), the knowledge of others as human 
beings requires the knowledge of human being with soul. The 
attitude towards ‘soul’ and the attitude towards a human being 
are similar or equal as opposed to, if I say, ‘my attitude towards 
a human being is an attitude towards a stone’. The attitude 
towards a human being and a stone are categorically distinct 
since a stone and a soul do not complement each other but a 
human being and a soul can. This way of looking at human 
being and soul is thus creative.  
The knowledge of ‘who’ and ‘what’ human being is never 
complete as the knowledge unfolds as the human beings engage 
with the world. On the other hand, one can predict the acts or 
status of other external things. This statement is in connection 
with how Wittgenstein is looking at the whole question of a 
human being. The human being is recognised not as an 
automaton but as one that has a soul. Having a soul as the 
defining feature of a human being is a religious view, but 
whether the term is soul or anything else, what is implied is that 
the object in concern behaves like a human being. Moreover, 
“[t]he human body is the best picture of the human soul” (PI 
178). What one considers as soul, the principle of life, empirically 
non-provable, is not a mysterious entity, rather it is that faculty 
with which a human person operates in the world, or its actions 
are expressed in the world through human actions. It could be 
simply argued from this point of view that the ‘identity’ and 
‘otherness’ are complementary concepts along with the concept 
of ‘I’. 
There have been discussions to find out the criteria by which 
Wittgenstein recognises the other and others’ minds or how we 
know that the other human beings too have similar thoughts 
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that we have. His earlier solipsistic position (TLP 5.6-5.641)20 
argued for an ‘I’ which is elusive, and has an inner which does 
not need an outer. In his later works, he seems to have qualified 
the position, and some might argue that he abandons completely 
the mental process. Wittgenstein does not deny mental processes 
or inner processes but makes a distinction between ‘pain’ and 
‘pain behaviour’. “And now it looks as if we had denied mental 
processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them” (PI 308). 
His arguments on ‘inner process’ and ‘outer criteria’ have given 
rise to multiple positions of behaviourism, relativism, and using 
the tools of analysis, analogy, and criterion to drive home the 
problem of other minds. These various interpretive positions are 
praiseworthy in explaining the philosophy of Wittgenstein.21 
However, without engaging with them for their merits and 
demerits, it could be stated that all these are the efforts of the 
interpreters to find out various criteria to determine the self and 
the other. Such criteria would never have been the concern of 
later Wittgenstein since the human form of life was as real as a 
flowing stream. 
The problem of other minds is relevant only from the point of 
view of the uniqueness of human being; the common perception 
of human being as different from an automaton or an animal. 
The statements like “[t]he human body is the best picture of the 
human soul”, “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a 
soul”, (PI 178) and “an inner process stands in need of outward 
criteria” (PI 580) indicate that Wittgenstein might fall into 
behaviourism. From these considerations, it can be proposed 
that a kind of behaviour is emphasised, like in the case of ‘pain 
behaviour’ or ‘thought-behaviour’- when a person expresses 
one’s thoughts through actions, like the ‘pain behaviour –though 
                                               
20Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. 
Ogden, London: Routledge, 1922. 
21For various viewpoints on the problem of other minds, see, 
Jonathan Ellis and Daniel Guevara, ed., Wittgenstein and the Philosophy 
of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. This edited book 
contains relevant articles that deal with these various interpretive 
positions.  
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both these ‘behaviours’ belong to different language-games. But 
‘behaviour’ in question is not like the ‘particular adaptive-end 
behaviour’ of an animal or mechanised system of an automaton. 
Human behaviour is ‘human act’ since it is ‘intentionally 
oriented’ to an end; the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ concurrently work 
to the end. Wittgenstein denies every inner process independent 
of life. The behaviour, if considered as only an action, 
independent of inner process that too cannot become a human 
action. Any activity of a human being, on this account, is subject 
to a thought-process, or any activity is simultaneously a well 
thought inner process; activity and inner process weave the 
human form of life, in which a living human being exists. 
The concept ‘living human being’ is critical in the thought of 
Wittgenstein in considering the existence of other human beings. 
“It comes to this: only of a living human being and what 
resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has 
sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious” (PI 281). Wittgenstein pinpoints the identity of a 
human being as a living human being. According to Jose 
Nandhikkara, “A living human being is an embodied subject 
with active and passive bodily and spiritual (rational, emotional, 
volitional, etc.) powers and is substantially and creatively 
present in the world. We live, move and have our being in the 
world.”22 Given the ontological constitution of the living human 
being and the possibility the resemblance of such beings in the 
world, the identity of others can also be inferred like-wise. The 
other human beings are not existent because of some criteria that 
‘I’ provide but because they are open to the view with all their 
behaviour, emotions, thought-behaviour, and the like. Others are 
their own criteria; their outer shows the inner. When a human 
person ‘lives’ in the world as ‘I’ live, there is no point in arguing 
                                               
22Jose Nandhikkara, “The Person: Project of Nature, Nurture and 
Grace: Philosophical Investigations after Wittgenstein”, Journal of 
Dharma 37, 1 (January-March 2012), 97-116, 106. Also see Jose 
Nandhikkara, Being Human after Wittgenstein: A Philosophical 
Anthropology, Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications, 2011. 
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that his/her existence is to be proved. His/her inner which is 
manifested in the outer itself provides the witness – the living 
human being is the witness itself. Someone might argue that a 
human being can pretend to such and such or there are no 
concrete expressions that reveal the inner. This is a valid 
objection as far as a human being can feign their experiences (PI 
nos. 156-160 and 250). People might pretend their activities like 
reading, loving or having pain, etc. However these are activities 
in themselves that cannot be distinguished between the real and 
the simulated. Even in pretending, there is an ‘inner’ which is 
expressed in the ‘outer’. The pretending itself is a language-
game among the varieties of language-games.23 The distinction 
of the real and the simulated can be differentiated only in the 
stream of life. To recognise the pretention one needs to have 
signs of pretence recognised: signs too are the ‘outer’ of the 
‘inner’. These are the linguistic signals that accord to the rule-
following of a language-game of pretence, just like the rule-
following of any other human activity. Thus, activities or 
behaviour of a living human being is open to the view, and is 
recognised as such in the public linguistic practice and language-
games. All these indicate that a human being is easily identified 
as such and the other is likewise identified as a human being – 
living human being. There is no scepticism or crisis in the 
knowledge of the other human beings nor is there any 
incompatibility of human behaviour as the expressions of the 
human ‘inner’.  
5. ‘Seeing As’: Identity and Otherness 
While understanding the process of recognising the existence of 
the self and others, identity and otherness, we have accorded 
Aquinas’ position of ‘indirect seeing’ via sensation, cogitation, 
and cognition. Aquinas seems to be systematising the whole 
process of thought and the mode of arriving at the knowledge of 
others. Wittgenstein could be restless to see something is being 
                                               
23M. R. M. Ter Hark, “The Development of Wittgenstein's Views 
about the Other Minds Problem,” Synthese 87, no. 2, (May 1991):227-
253. 
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known through any process, which is fragmented and divided 
(PI 196-197); he conceives the ‘knowledge of something’ not as a 
process but as a continuum. From Aquinas’ account, sensation 
and intellection are the two processes which seem to have their 
own proper activities; the scope of intellection is different from 
the scope of sensation. This way of looking at the whole process 
might cause confusion and may advance unilateral roles of 
senses and intellect, as it has occurred in the history of 
philosophy; theses of rationalism and empiricism. It is very 
unlikely that a realist like Aquinas might advocate a divisive or 
compartmentalised process of knowledge, whether it be of 
oneself or of the others. It could be that, for the sake of 
understanding the process better, a systematic and analytical 
approach of scrutinising each stages of the human being in the 
process of knowing is emphasised. The analysis helps in 
understanding the scope of sensation and intellection, and their 
mutual enrichment. Given the details of the process as 
continually related to sensation, cogitation, and intellection, and 
the incompleteness of each stage without the other, indicate that 
he also has proposed ‘knowing process’ as ‘seeing as’ the way 
Wittgenstein considers. In no way this undermines the reality of 
the one act of ‘seeing as’. Even when Wittgenstein presents 
‘seeing as’ he admits that there is no stereotype and monotonous 
‘seeing as’ but ‘seeing as’ as always unpredictable and flexible. 
His allusion to the ‘elasticity’ of ‘what is seen’ (PI 198)24 reveals 
that the seeing is not constrained to ‘one act’ alone but a 
combination of multiple aspects that converge and diverge. Even 
an ‘aspect seeing’ in ‘seeing as’ is not just a single act, but it is 
also connected with various other interconnected aspects. While 
looking at the face of a person for some time, one can recognise 
the multiple expressions of emotions; yet they are the ‘outer’ of 
an ‘inner’. While Aquinas seems to have divided the process of 
knowledge, in reality, he sees that as one act with multiple 
                                               
24This is a way of saying that something can be known without 
complicated process of sensation and thought process, but it is an act 
which occurs spontaneously. 
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‘aspects’. These aspects are neither construed in the sanctuary of 
the soul nor are simulations, nor are inducted from the external 
affairs, but it is a movement from the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ and vice 
versa. 
In this way, in a broader analysis, the questions of ‘identity’ 
and ‘otherness’ are relational concepts, interwoven language-
games within the human engagements in the human form of life. 
Human activities can hardly be analysed in isolation: earning 
livelihood, entertainment, forming groups, marriage, family, 
responding to societal needs, academic pursuits, survival 
projects, influencing others, etc., are not done with a unilateral 
‘adaptive end’, but with intention, freedom, goodness, dignity, 
purpose, corrective measures, trial and error, sense of justice, etc. 
The former ones are open to the view since they can be identified 
easily as ‘activities proper’ in a general sense. Usually the latter 
ones are not considered as activities proper but as ‘attitudes’ or 
‘qualities’ that may accompany the former ones. However, the 
latter ones are also equally ‘activities proper to human persons’ 
expressed through the former ones. There is no dichotomy 
between the two, rather correspondence or relationality where 
‘the activities proper’ (outer) are entrenched with the ‘qualities’ 
(inner). Paradoxically, the inner is to be deemed by people as 
those ones proper to human beings (only the human beings have 
the profound inner), but they are often put under sceptical 
scanner since they are not ‘open to the view’. Just like the ‘outer’ 
is considered as the witness of the ‘inner’, the ‘other’ can be the 
certainty of my ‘identity’, since I do not have to consider my 
identity as a human being if there are no other human beings to 
ascertain it indirectly through their presence. Their presence is 
an active presence where dialogue, communication, sharing, and 
relationality are at work. The ‘other’ becomes intelligible 
through its ‘presence’ and engagements.  
Ontologically, the ‘identity’ has precedence over the ‘other’, 
since if there is no ‘I’ there is no possibility of knowledge in its 
strict sense. Epistemologically, the ‘other’ takes the importance, 
since the knowledge of the self is through the other or the 
‘knowledge’ itself is for the sake of the other. Given that, there 
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are no a-priori language-games or rule-following, and language-
games evolve as the human life progresses, and consequently, 
the rule-following also progresses as such. The ‘identity’ and 
‘otherness’, then, are dynamic concepts that resist unidirectional 
definition or explanation. As the human world develops from 
one century to another or one epoch to another, the evolution of 
these concepts occur progressively since the ‘inner’ and the 
‘outer’ vary according to the human engagements with the 
world. 
6. Conclusion 
The investigation so far was an attempt to understand the 
relevance of Aquinas and Wittgenstein on the concepts of 
‘identity’ and ‘otherness’, and how their perspectives contribute 
to the present day understanding of self and the other. Aquinas’ 
notion of indirect knowledge of the self endorses the existence of 
the other. This mediate knowledge of the self and the other point 
out to the whole network of relations at work in the ‘seeing as’ of 
human knowledge. Wittgenstein’s tool of language-games and 
rule-following places the ‘subjectivist turn’ and ‘objectivist turn’ 
on the plateau of variability and stability, which I consider, as 
the hinge points of knowing the self, identity, and otherness. 
Another attempt was to address the extremes of extensionless 
Cartesian privacy and the ‘mindless’ objectivity. I have argued 
that the concepts of self, identity, and otherness from Thomistic 
and Wittgensteinian perspectives neutralise the extremes. These 
extreme positions are recurrent in the human life in the forms of 
‘individualism’ and ‘consumerism/utilitarianism’. Paradoxically 
individualism and consumerism in the present day human 
context are interrelated unlike private ‘I’ and pure objectivity. 
The boundary between the two is relationality which is 
proposed as the paradigm of ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’. 
However, relationality as a paradigm of knowing the self and 
the other needs to address further the ontological, 
anthropological, and existential dimension of being a human 
person. The scope of this article confines itself to the 
epistemological interpretation. Again, it is to be admitted that 
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the epistemological project is not all embracing since the project 
takes a mediate route that diminishes the lustre of individuality 
of a human person. Individuality is an ontological status of a 
person since an individual is primarily an ‘existent’ and then 
related to other individuals, where as, ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’, 
because of the indirect knowing process, are intrinsically related 
to each other epistemologically. Thus, a further investigation can 
be undertaken to understand the complexity of the ontological 
status of ‘identity’ and ‘other’, and the epistemological position 
of an ‘individual’. 
A further argument is concerned with the linguistic practices 
and the evolving language-games within a human community 
that widen the horizon of ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’ and 
encounter new epistemic challenges but can be solved according 
to the kind of language-games and rule-following of the new 
situations. Again, bringing everything under the dynamism of 
language-games has two important consequences. The first is a 
possibility of relativistic interpretation of rather stable concepts 
like ‘identity’ and ‘other’, and as a corollary to this view, 
philosophical scepticism; whether there is a person existing at all 
as a result of understanding the ‘self’ through the other, or 
whether the self is existing through linguistic practices. The 
danger is that the concept of ‘self’ can be constructed 
epistemologically without the support of ontology. Secondly, 
there is a possibility of interpreting the concepts of ‘identity’ and 
‘otherness’ from a strict modern/enlightenment idea of self (as a 
private ‘I’ or bundle of perceptions) to the wider interpretation 
of ‘identity’ and ‘otherness’ forming a horizon: the horizon of 
language-games, individuality, identity, otherness, self, etc. The 
concepts are not sacrosanct in order that they can be untouched, 
but they are embedded in the language-games and human 
engagements, and therefore viable for progressive and 
alternative views. The interaction of these concepts synchronise 
with the contemporary existential and phenomenological 
projects on human person. A further research on this perspective 
would bring closer Aquinas and Wittgenstein to the 
contemporary reader. 
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THE SELF: Metaphysical Reality vs 
Communicative Device 
Anil Kumar Tewari 
Abstract: The objective of this article is to juxtapose the non-
Buddhist and the Buddhist viewpoints of Indian philosophy on 
the notion of the self in order to see the rationality behind their 
conceptions. To pursue this objective, the paper is divided into 
four sections. The introductory section points to various usages of 
the expression ‘self’ in common parlance, which tends to 
encompass everything that matters to an individual. The second 
section describes various approaches adopted by the major 
systems of Indian philosophy towards the self. It is shown that the 
conception of the self as a metaphysical substance is more 
amenable to those Indian philosophical systems that believe in the 
plurality of individual selves. The third section is mainly 
concerned with the Buddhist counter-narrative to the notion of 
substantive metaphysical self. Since the parsimony of the 
Buddhist proposal lies in its metaphysical non-proliferation, the 
linguistic entities such as the self (jīva) or soul (ātman) purportedly 
referring to a substantive entity are declared metaphysically 
vacuous, but the convention of language enables us to pick out 
the intended referent which is nothing but individual person. 
Thus the above metaphysical concepts of the non-Buddhist 
systems of Indian philosophy turn out to be a 'communicative 
device' in Buddhism, without any metaphysical bearing. 
                                               
Dr Anil Kumar Tewari, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Head 
of the School of Philosophy & Culture at Shri Mata Vaishno Devi 
University, Katra (Jammu & Kashmir), obtained his PhD from IIT 
Kanpur in 2010 and worked on the Concept of Personal Identity in 
Buddhist Philosophy. His publications include more than 20 articles in 
various journals and conference proceedings. A recipient of three 
awards from All India Philosophy Association for his research 
contributions, Dr. Tewari is also an Associate Fellow of Indian 
Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. 
344 Anil Kumar Tewari 
 
Journal of Dharma 43, 3 (July-September 2018) 
Keywords: Ātman, Buddhism, Jīva, Indian Philosophy, Nyāya, 
Śarīra, Self, Vedānta, Puggala. 
1. Introduction 
It is more than a truism to say that the understanding of the self 
has a bearing on the understanding of the other. The other is 
nothing but the self and therefore the perception of a division 
between the two is erroneous, the other is numerically distinct but 
qualitatively same as the self, the other is the ‘possibilities’ of the 
self, are some illustrative examples each indicating a specific 
notion of the self. The self is, thus, understood in various ways 
ranging from the notion of a robust metaphysical reality to an 
ontologically vacuous linguistic entity. In a poetic language, 
William James (1842-1910) describes the variegated usages of the 
notion Self: 
… a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only 
his body and his psychic powers, but his cloths and his house, 
his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation 
and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account. 
All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and 
prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he 
feels cast down … The constituents of the Self … make up 
respectively: (a) the material Self; (b) the social Self; (c) the 
spiritual Self; and (d) the pure ego.1 
Some would say that it is a simple active substance, the soul, of 
which they are thus conscious; others claim that it is nothing but a 
fiction, the imaginary being denoted by the pronoun I; and 
between these extremes of opinion all sorts of intermediaries 
would be found.2  
The range of the meanings of the ‘self’ in the above quote is 
enough to baffle one’s mind as to what could be the truth of the 
                                               
1William James, The Principles of Psychology, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1983, 279-80. The term “Self” with capital letter “S” is 
intended to refer to its wider applicability, that is, meaning differently 
in different contexts. CAN is conspicuous in the italic part. “Self” 
means me as much as mine. 
2James, The Principles of Psychology, 286. 
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self. A definite answer to this question is essential in as much as it 
is the understanding of the self which enables one to adopt a 
perspective towards the other—a sine qua non to all behavioural 
transactions with the other. What follows is a survey of the 
insights available in major Indian philosophical systems with 
respect to the self. An attempt is made to bring these insights into 
two broad categories, namely, metaphysical reality and 
communicative device.  
2. Perspectives towards the Self in the Philosophies of India 
In Indian philosophy, the metaphysical exploration with regard to 
the self generally proceeds with three considerations:  
(1) What is it that gives life to a human body?  
(2) What is it that makes a human being a cognitive agent?  
(3) What unifies different experiences of a human being so 
that he or she identifies himself or herself as the same person 
undergoing different experiences at different times?  
These three considerations, stated differently, relate to the 
principle of life or animation, the principle of cognition, and the 
principle of unity and continuity of experience respectively.3 The 
self (aka ātman, jīvātman, puruṣa, etc.) is regarded as a fundamental 
metaphysical reality by all systems of Indian philosophy except 
the Cārvāka and Buddhism, and it is believed to perform the 
above three functions of animation, cognition and unification. It 
gives life to the physical body of an organism.4 When the self 
departs from the (sthūla—i. e., gross) body, the body loses its 
regenerative force and disintegrates into its constituting elements. 
                                               
3A philosophical analysis of this observation can be seen in 
Anthony Quinton’s article “The Soul,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
59, no. 15, (July 1962): 393-409. 
4Matthew Kapstein discusses ‘personalistic vitalism’ in this sense 
of the self. According to this theory "there is a particular substance 
which is at once the self-conscious subject, the ground for personal 
identity through time, and which, when appropriately associated with 
a functional animal body, causes that body to be alive." Matthew T. 
Kapstein, “Śāntarakṣita on the Fallacies of Personalistic Vitalism,” 
Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 17, 1989, 44. 
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The self carries all along with it the life force (prāṇa), senses 
(indriyas), mind (manas) and the residual impressions (saṁskāras) 
brought forth from the previous and present states of existence. 
These accompanying factors are cumulatively called subtle body 
(sūkṣma śarīra). The cumulative effect of impressions appropriates 
a gross body to which the prāṇa enlivens and in which the senses 
live for the self. Thus, the self is believed to be the actual cognitive 
agent that requires a physical body for its cognitive (and other) 
operations. With the help of sense-organs, the self acquires 
knowledge about the world. Also, it functions as the unifying 
substance between discrete experiences and thereby gives rise to 
the sense of ‘I’, which becomes the locus of all thoughts, 
experiences, hopes and desires. This metaphysical self is regarded 
the essence of a human being.  
In the Ṛg Veda, the term ‘ātman’ is often used to refer to the 
essence of beings in general. For instance, at one place the term 
‘ātmā’ is used to denote the essence of gods as well as the world5 
and the broader application includes the essence of everything—
natural forces, medicinal plants, and the essence of the addressee. 
The diversity of the usages of the term ‘ātman’ in the Vedic 
literature enables one to retroject into it the multiple senses of the 
self developed by systemic philosophies in India later. The later 
appellations such as ātman, jīvātman, puruṣa, etc. are aptly used to 
refer to the essence of living beings. 
One may however contend that the above metaphysical 
entities cannot be consistently maintained to be the bearer of the 
identity of an individual. For, when we use the term ‘self’, we 
often mean a person’s ‘personality’ or ‘character’ in virtue of 
which one person differs from the others. Being the essence of all 
beings, the ‘ātman’ cannot be appropriately rendered as the ‘self’ 
(or ‘soul’). Since the essence of all beings is qualitatively (one may 
say substantially also) the same, and the self cannot suo motu 
confer any individuating determinations on any organism, let 
alone be the identifying feature of a human person. No wonder if 
                                               
5Ātmā devānām bhuvanasya garbho, Sri Ram Sharma Acarya, ed. & 
trans., Ṛg Veda, Shantinikunja: Brahmavarcasa, Vol. 4, Maṇḍala 9-10, 
1996, 10.168.4. 
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one doubts whether a person is an embodied-ātman at all in this 
broad or universalistic sense of the term. Contrasted with this, 
there is also a narrow or individualistic notion of ātman, which 
does not find its explicit expression owing to the preponderantly 
cosmogonical approach of the early Vedic thinkers. However, 
subsequently, this sense becomes pronounced in the Upaniṣads. 
The Upaniṣads not only talk about individual essence and the 
essence of the universe, but also eventually declare identity 
between the two. However, this equation does not enlighten us in 
regard to the emergence of individuality any more than the 
permutations of universal elements beget the sense of 
individuality. Ātman is the beginningless underlying reality of 
everything existing. In contradistinction to ‘ātman’, the term ‘jīva’ 
or ‘jīvātman’ is used to refer to an individual. According to the 
Advaitic reading of the Upaniṣads, jīva has a beginning and an 
end—it begins its journey with the sense of individuality and 
submerges its individuality in the supreme reality in the end. 
Therefore, it is not taken to be immortal in its individual form.6 
The jīva or the individual self is not mortal either; it is 
essentially the ātman coupled with the mind, senses and body. 
Contrary to the Advaitic conception, the term ‘jīva’ is used to refer 
to an immortal ‘individual being’ prominently by those 
philosophical systems which accept the plurality of individual 
selves in their fundamental ontology. Jainism and the theistic 
Vedānta traditions (namely, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita Vedāntins) 
use the term precisely in this sense. The combined system of 
Sāṅkhya-Yoga uses the term ‘puruṣa’ for the same purpose. The 
Naiyāyikas use the term ‘jīvātman’ in the same sense. Despite 
                                               
6In the Vedānta Paribhāṣā of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra (trans. Sw. 
Madhvananda, Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, 12th reprint 2011), four kinds 
of dissolutions are discussed. They are nitya (the dissolution of all 
manifest activities during profound sleep state), prākṛta (the 
dissolution of all effects), naimittika (the withdrawal of all worlds into 
the Creator) and ātyantika (the dissolution of all individualities 
consequent on the realization of Brahman). It is the last kind of 
dissolution where the individualities end due to an absolute dispelling 
of nescience (172-3).  
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notable internal differences on the nature of the self, these non-
Advaita systems concur on the individualistic notion of ātman and 
accept this individual unchanging metaphysical entity as the 
ultimate (metaphysical) base of individuality. One may consider 
the Sāṁkhya arguments for the plurality of selves as representative of 
this view. 
The Buddhists however are quite insistent on denying the 
existence of such an unchanging entity. Their major argument 
rests on the doctrine of impermanence (anitya), rather 
momentariness (kṣaṇikatva), which advocates for an incessant 
change in the reality (sat) which is a necessary condition for any 
reality to be causally efficacious (arthakriyākāri). For any object to 
produce an effect, it must undergo change, according to the 
Buddhists. The 10th-11th century CE Nyāya thinker Udayanācārya 
fights tooth and nail against this argument of the Buddhists in the 
very first part of his Ātmatattvaviveka.7 He says, inter alia, that a 
necessary relation between the reality and momentariness is 
unfounded (asiddha), therefore we cannot consistently derive the 
nature of reality proposed by the Buddhists.  
2.1 Consideration of Multiple Approaches 
Considering the diversity of opinions on the notion of 
individuality, one can sort out three fundamental approaches in 
the later systemic development of classical Indian philosophy. 
These different approaches are based on the variations in the 
metaphysical commitments of different philosophical systems. 
They are: (1) the multiplicity of selves approach, (2) the monistic 
or absolutistic approach, and (3) the false grammar approach. 
                                               
7Udayanācārya, "Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda," Ātmatattvaviveka, Calcutta: The 
Asiatic Society, 1986. Both, impermanence and momentariness show 
the changing character of the reality. However, whereas the former 
grants the durational presence of an object, the latter proposes an 
incessant change. Udayana argues against the latter position which, in 
some sense, logical corollary of the former because unless we accept a 
persistent change in the object, an account of its impermanence seems 
impossible.  
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According to the first viewpoint, there is a plurality of 
individual selves, one such self resides in each person’s body. A 
person is thus an embodied self. This approach is adopted by the 
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Jainism, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Mīmāṁsā and 
the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta systems of philosophy. The Advaita 
Vedānta also espouses the multiplicity of selves view at the 
phenomenal (vyavahāra) level. The self, as these systems believe, is 
located8 in the heart (hṛdaya) of a person. If the self is the essence 
of an individual, and all the individual selves are qualitatively 
indistinguishable one from another, then all persons are 
essentially the same. However, persons are recognized as distinct 
individuals in virtue of their having some adventitious properties. 
Should one then suggest that the principle of individuation is 
determined by some accidental (material) properties? The 
Naiyāyikas rule out such a possibility. For them, though the 
selves are qualitatively indistinguishable, yet they are numerically 
distinct in virtue of having certain distinctive features. According 
to their metaphysical belief, all indivisible and eternal substances, 
including the selves, involve a uniqueness called ‘particularity’ or 
‘individuality’ (viśeṣa). These substances are distinct from other 
                                               
8Conspicuously, every Indian philosophical system considers 
heart, the most vital organ in our body, to be the residing place of 
consciousness. We may call it the cardiovascular interpretation of 
consciousness as opposed to the neurophysiological interpretation of 
the Western philosophical systems, particularly cognitive sciences. In 
the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the ātman is described as residing in the 
lotus of heart and is smaller than a grain of paddy, than a barely corn, 
than a mustard seed, than a grain of millet or the kernel of a grain of 
millet. After that, it is paradoxically asserted that this ātman is greater 
than the earth, than the sky, than the heaven and than all these worlds 
(eṣa ma ātmā antaḥ hṛdaye aṇīyānvrīhervā yavādvā sarṣapādvā śyāmākādvā 
śyāmāktaṇḍulādvaiṣa ma ātmāntarahṛdaye jyāyānpṛthivyā jyāyāntarik-
ṣajjyāyāndivo jyāyānebhyo lokebhyaḥ, Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 3.14.3, 
Swahananda Swami, trans., Madras: Sri Rama Krishna Matha, 1980). 
The paradoxical expressions seem indicating the ineffable character of 
ātman. 
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members of their own class due to viśeṣa, which is the basis of 
absolute differentiation and specification.9 
But, the positing of this unique feature should be seen as an 
effort to maintain the particularity of indistinguishable entities 
which are non-composite and eternal. Ramakrishna Puligandla 
interprets viśeṣa "as the peculiarity by virtue of which something 
is an ultimate entity."10 This is how the Naiyāyikas seek to 
provide metaphysical support to the commonplace belief in the 
multiplicity of individuals. The rest of the systems also accept the 
multiplicity of selves to account for individual difference in terms 
of different subjects.  
The second approach is monistic or absolutistic in outlook. 
The diversity of the phenomenal reality springs from a 
fundamental reality, which is not diverse. The diversity, from this 
perspective, is only apparent. The Advaitins are the main 
proponent of this viewpoint. For them, the Self (Brahman or 
ātman) is the only reality, which is non-dual, undifferentiated, 
immutable, transcendental consciousness (this theory may be 
called Spiritualistic Monism). The individual consciousnesses 
(jīvas) are mere false appearances of universal consciousness or 
Brahman. We identify ourselves as distinct individuals only for 
worldly purposes. Moreover, this false identification is originally 
ingrained in metaphysical ignorance of the true nature of reality. 
Hence, ignorance (avidyā) is the determining principle of 
individuation. Such ignorance induces a false perception which, 
in turn, is binding on the individual, it is also called causal body 
(kāraṇa śarīra).11 In the process of the formation of human 
personality, the causal body occasions an appropriate subtle-body 
                                               
9Anyatra-antyebhyo viṣeśebhyaḥ (1.2.6), meaning that which exists as the 
differentiator (atyanta-vyāvṛttibuddhi-hetuḥ) of the end-substances is called 
viśeṣa, from The Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. VI - The Vaiśeṣikasūtra of 
Kaṇāda ed., B. D. Basu, trans., Nandalal Sinha, Allahabad: Bhuvaneśwarī 
Āśrama, 1923.  
10Ramakrishna Puligandla, Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy, New 
Delhi: D. K. Printworld, 2005, 170. 
11Vidyāraṇyamuni, Pañcadaśī, Krishnanada Sagar, trans., Uttar 
Kashi: Shri Totakacharya Ashrama, 1984, 1.17. 
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(sūkṣma śarīra). The subtle body is said to be the combination of 
five sensory modalities (jñānendriyas), five motor organs 
(karmendriyas), five vital forces (prāṇas), mind (manas), and intellect 
(buddhi).12 This body is also called the mark body (liṅga śarīra). The 
mark body appropriates a gross body (sthūla śarīra), which is 
constitutive of the five gross elements (mahābhūtas). 
What is significant here is the distinction between the causal 
body, the subtle body and the gross body. Actually, these are not 
three numerically distinct bodies (relating to an individual); 
rather they all house one personality and in this process the 
former causes the latter. What is sensually available is only the 
gross body; other bodies are conditions of the gross body. But the 
formation of a particular gross body depends on the 
programming of the subtle body, which is the receptacle of the 
residual impressions of previous deeds performed by the 
individual under the spell of ignorance. It is the subtle body, 
which transmigrates and thus continues the cycle of death and 
birth. 
According to another analysis of human personality,13 the 
gross body, which is the composition of amalgamated five 
elements of materiality (pañcīkṛta-mahabhutas), is called 
annamayakosa and is sustained by food. The five vital forces (five 
prāṇas) along with the five motor-organs form prāṇamayakosa. As it 
is believed, they draw their forces from individual consciousness 
(dehī or jīvātmā).14 The prāṇas are subtler than the gross elements 
and thus they are regarded as superior to the physical elements. 
The next thing of greater subtlety is our mental make-up, which is 
called manomayakosa. It consists of mind and the five sense-organs 
which are responsible for all our experiences. It is the mind which 
generates the sense of ‘I-’ or ‘Ego-consciousness’ in us. Subtler still 
than the ego-consciousness is the intellect or ideational 
consciousness (vijñānamayakosa), which receives glimpses of pure 
                                               
12Vidyāraṇyamuni, Pañcadaśī, 1.22-23. 
13Īśādi-nau-Upaniṣad: Iśa, Kena, Kaṭha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇdūkya, 
Aitareya, Taittirīya and Śvetāśvatara, Hrikrishna Das Goyandaka, trans., 
Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 13th edition 1993. Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 2.2-5.  
14Īśādi-nau-Upaniṣad, Kaṭhopaniṣad, 2.2.3-5. 
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and blissful consciousness (ānandamayakosa). The prāṇamaya, 
manomaya and vijñānamaya kosas constitute the subtle body. The 
ānandamayakosa is the innermost and subtlest substratum of all 
other kosas. It is also called the causal body or kāraṇa śarīra. What 
is called ātman pervades all the five grades of human personality 
and is progressively identified with everything from the grossest 
level to the subtlest one in the journey of spiritual development. 
Since these realizations are believed to be liberating, they cannot 
be called the result of māyā and ignorance. 
Given many frames of reference of the term ātman, any 
attempt to reduce it to only one of them would create problem. 
However, amidst all the variegated senses, the prominent sense is 
the ‘essence’ or the crucial aspect of a being. For instance, the most 
intimate bodily process on which the life of an organism is 
dependent is breathing. In view of this anatomical fact, the Vedic 
seers identify ātman with the life force (prāṇa), the force that makes 
breathing possible. And, with the same fervent, they equate ātman 
with the mind, senses etc.—the factors which are crucial for the 
life of an individual. But when the question as to the true nature 
of atman comes, all such equations are gradually denied retaining 
one: the essence of life or the underlying reality of everything. In 
this sense, we can understand the Upaniṣadic proclamation of 
identity between individual essence and cosmic essence.  
Individual essence is incarnated in the substantial form of 
ātman, jīva or puruṣa in the later systemic philosophies. This 
metaphysical essence is believed to underlie all experiences of an 
individual in virtue of being the hub of the body (cause, subtle 
and gross). But it seems a folly to hold this (universal) principle 
responsible for the formation of individual life births after birth. 
The problem becomes more intractable when this principle is said 
to be present in the body even when all other associates depart 
from the body to render it dead.15 This discussion shows that the 
principle of individuality can be anything but the (universal) 
ātman. One may conjecture that the principle of individuation can 
only be matter. It is the material or physical aspect of human 
                                               
15Īśādi-nau-Upaniṣad, Kaṭhopaniṣad, 2.2.4. 
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personality that provides ground for distinguishing one person 
from another. The principle of individuation is nothing but the 
function of material composition (Materialistic Monism). Classical 
Indian philosophical systems talk of individuating criteria in the 
framework of bodily categories, namely, causal body (kārmaṇa 
śarīra), subtle body (sūkṣma śarīra) and gross body (sthūla śarīra). 
Karel Werner16 also develops his thesis on the Vedic notion of 
‘tanu’, which is purportedly a quasi-physical-essence of a person 
and can be kept alive in a heavenly realm through prescribed 
ritualistic performances. In common Hindi parlance, the term 
‘tanu’ is used to denote ‘body’, which is an evident marker of an 
individual person. In the Ṛg Veda, this term is often used to refer 
to the physical aspect of beings.17 But, as Radhakrishnan remarks, 
there is no such thing as the individual centre of life at the 
biological level.18 All organisms are equal in terms of their 
physiology except, of course, some graduated functional 
differences. But, taking cue from one’s own feeling, one always 
wonders whether this is all that there is to individuate human 
personality, or there is a further fact beyond the merely physical. 
The śarīras (i.e., mere physical) are not capable of existing 
independently; they lean on an independent principle, namely, 
the self (ātman). There are different positions though regarding 
whether there is just one ātman or many. 
The self (ātman), as described in the Kaṭhopaniṣad,19 is free from 
the fetters of birth and death (aja) and is not subject to cause and 
effect (na ayaṁ kutscinna babhūva kascit). It is eternal (nitya or 
śāśvata) and essentially conscious (vipaścit). The self is often 
described in contradictory terms20 indicating the inadequacy of 
the language to capture it in entirety. The nature of the self is felt 
to be beyond the reach of the categories of understanding. 
                                               
16Karel Werner, “Indian Concepts of Human Personality in Relation to the 
Doctrine of the Soul,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 1 (1988): 73-97.  
17Ṛg Veda, 10.116.5, 10.157.3, 10.183.2 etc. 
18S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, New Delhi: Indus, 1994, 
271. 
19Īśādi-nau-Upaniṣad, Kaṭhopaniṣad, 1.2.18. 
20Īśādi-nau-Upaniṣad, Kaṭhopaniṣad, 1.2.21. 
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However, in its individuated form, the self is said to be ‘the owner 
of the body’ (rathinaṁ).21 In the Advaitic interpretation, the 
individuated forms of the self are mere appearances or distorted 
reflections of the non-dual universal self. But, this Upaniṣadic 
insight is developed into the full-blooded individualistic 
conception of ātman by the pluralist systems of Indian philosophy 
such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Saṅkhya-Yoga, and the 
Mīmāṁsā. The intuitive plausibility of the acceptance of the 
existence of a distinct non-physical self in every individual is 
traceable in the psychological necessity to account for the 
differences in the unity and ownership of experiences. 
But, the same intuitive suggestion may also be counter-
intuitive from the Buddhists’ perspective. For, they question the 
idea of a non-physical eternal substance and explain the unity of a 
mental life without resorting to any such queer entity. Also, they 
analyze human personality without using any such metaphysical 
principle as the self. Since our experiential knowledge reveals 
everything in the world as transient, the acceptance of the 
existence of the self as an unchanging entity is unwarranted. It has 
further repercussions in the understanding the meanings of 
personal pronouns. This leads us to the third viewpoint, which 
may be called the ‘false grammar approach’. 
3. The False Grammar Approach 
The tendency to look for a fixed referent of the term ‘I’ or other 
personal pronouns is connected with the unitary feeling in our 
experiences. Radhakrishnan says that we have such a feeling in 
virtue of being a self-conscious being: "Self-consciousness is like a 
chord which is able to bind and keep together all the discrete 
experiences of an individual."22 Self-consciousness is generally 
understood as the consciousness of an individual who considers 
himself or herself as the subject of manifold experiences. The 
linguistic correlates of the subjects of experiences are the personal 
pronouns. The ‘referential demand’ of these pronominal 
indexicals is such that one is gullibly inclined to believe in the 
                                               
21Īśādi-nau-Upaniṣad, Kaṭhopaniṣad, 1.3.3. 
22Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View, 278. 
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ontology of queer or mysterious individual entities or subjects.23 
Thus, what seems to be an innocuous fact of grammar may turn 
out to be an unwarranted metaphysical hypostatization. 
According to the Buddhist logicians, being mental constructions, 
the linguistic symbols fail to refer to the actual reality because 
they are afflicted with our tendency to associate the experiences 
with name, genus etc. (kalpanā). The Buddhist tradition, therefore, 
invests much of its energy to make sense of the self as subject or 
person (Pāli, puggala; Sanskrit, pudgala) as such not as a referent of 
language.24 
3.1 The Self as Subject or Person 
The individualistic conception of the self presumes an irreducible 
uniqueness in every human individual in virtue of which he or 
she is an individual as opposed to a collective or a group. The 
search for the metaphysical underpinning of such uniqueness 
often results in accepting the existence of a queer immaterial 
substance, an enduring substratum of changing experiences, 
which is often conceived on the analogy of a physical thing. Thus 
the self-same substance is said to be a subject of all experiences. 
Ordinarily, a subject is defined as a being which has experiences, 
either of something in existence or purely imaginary or of 
                                               
23Jose Nandhikkara, “Human Subjectivity: A Philosophical 
Investigation after Wittgenstein,” Journal of Dharma, 33.1 (January-
March 2008), 19-32. By referring to Wittgenstein, Nandhikkara 
observes that the expressions such as “‘soul’, ‘spirit’, ‘mind’, ‘reason’, 
‘will’, etc., are not used to refer to something in the way ‘body’ refers 
to a body…we need to look and see the actual uses of these words in 
relation to human being” (20). They are meaningful in relation to 
human subjectivity and any further assumption would take us beyond 
the purport of these terms. Also see Jose Nandhikkara, Being HUman 
after Wittgenstein: A Philosophical Anthropology, Bangalore: Dharmaram 
Publications, 2011. 
24For instance, in the Puggalapaññattipāli, the fourth work of the 
Buddhist cannon Abhidhamma Piṭaka, human personality is analyzed 
without any reference to eternal self. See for details Abhidhammapiṭake 
Puggalapaññattipāli, trans. Om Prakash Pathak with Veena Gaur, Delhi: 
New Bharatiya Book Corporation, 2000.  
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something entirely abstract. The concept of subject is basically tied 
up with the epistemological sense of a person. The subject is 
generally understood as ‘the subject of different experiences’. One 
considers oneself as the same subject of various experiences. And 
this consideration is based on one’s ability to identify oneself as a 
continuing person. 
A subject or person is thus regarded as the persistent 
substratum of all thoughts and therefore the enabling condition of 
knowledge, recognition and retention. However, it has been a 
matter of dispute whether there actually is such a unique 
metaphysical substance. Buddhism explains our natural belief in 
the existence of such an entity as a fictional construct of the 
imagination. However, even if there is an ineffable metaphysical 
substance, how can it be turned to itself to know it objectively? 
The paradox of understanding the subject in objective terms is 
quite pronounced in Yājñavalkya’s wondering about how the 
subject can be made part of an objective knowledge.25 A subject 
cannot make itself an object of its own knowledge in the way 
things other than itself (the subject) can be objects of its 
knowledge. For, the subject is the very source of knowledge. 
Hence the subject pole stands diametrically opposed to the object 
pole, and both the poles are flanked by experience.  
The existence of the subject is accepted as a self-evidencing 
fact, since everyone has an unmistakable belief in one’s own 
existence. Everyone has an inner access to one’s subjectivity. And 
because of this direct access, knowledge of the subject, or self-
knowledge, involves a higher certitude than knowledge of an 
object. The knowledge of anything other than one’s own existence 
is a mediated knowledge, and therefore the reliability of the 
medium becomes a significant factor for the veracity of such 
mediated knowledge. On the other hand, due to the immediate 
and self-evidencing nature of self-knowledge, its certainty is 
evident. The unerring awareness of one’s subjectivity is 
emphasized by K. C. Bhattacharyya with reference to the notion 
                                               
25Yenedam sarvam vijānāti tam kena vijānīyāt, meaning everything is 
known by the knower, but who is to know the knower? Īśādi-nau-
Upaniṣad, Bṛahdāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 285. 
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of meaning. In his view, while the object of knowledge is what is 
meant by the knowing subject, the subject is other than the object 
and is therefore not a meant entity. The subject, being the 
‘meaner’, can of course not be the ‘meant’.26 
What exactly is the reason for saying that self-knowledge is 
not a matter of knowing anything with a meant content? We may 
try to examine this question in a manner that involves our 
extrapolation on the unique nature of the subject as self. Objective 
knowledge is that of a meant entity inasmuch as it is knowledge 
of what it means to be this or that object. And understanding 
what it means to be a certain object depends on our knowledge of 
what predicates are true of the object. Objective knowledge is 
therefore a matter of our having predicative access to the object in 
question. Self-knowledge is subjective, and knowledge of 
subjectivity must have a peculiarity in virtue of which self-
knowledge amounts to knowledge of something without any 
meant content. Bhattacharyya conceives of self-knowledge as a 
non-predicative or non-attributive mode of knowing the subject. 
In distinguishing self-knowledge from knowledge of objects, he 
remarks: "The object is known as distinct from the subject but the 
subject is known in itself and felt to be free from the object."27 
While this sounds like an innocuous remark on the distinctness of 
the subject from the object, there is something significant in it in 
so far as reference is made to the subject’s feeling of freedom from 
the object.  
Since self-knowledge is said to be knowledge of the subject in 
itself, it implies that this knowledge is acquired by the subject by 
being independent of its usual objective association with other 
things. This independence from objective association of the 
subject with the world of objects is to be understood as a 
condition for the possibility of true self-knowledge. It is a 
condition of recognizing the self from the non-predicative 
standpoint. Once the subject is able to dissociate itself from the 
objective order, the non-predicative attitude of self-perception 
                                               
26K. C. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, Gopinatha 
Bhattacharyya, ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983, 367. 
27Bhattacharyya, Studies, 385. Emphasis added. 
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becomes naturally available to the subject. For, all predicative self-
recognition is due to the association of the self with the world of 
objects. To be the subject in itself is, therefore, to be free from the 
predicative way of viewing oneself, and so to be free from 
objective association.  
Moreover, any process of the predicative mode of self-
identification results in the objectification of the subject. Once the 
self is so objectified, the question of its ontological status becomes 
prominent. It then opens up the floodgate of metaphysical 
controversy.28 While this is the way K. C. Bhattacharyya’s 
reflections on the nature of the subject indicates the possibility of 
an avoidable metaphysical controversy over the nature of the self, 
it also has relevance to the same controversy that occurs between 
the Buddhists and the non-Buddhists. What makes the former 
case relevant to the latter is the common point of the predicative 
mode of determining the reality of the self. This commonality is 
most prominent in the case of the Nyāya arguments for the 
existence of the self as the locus of immaterial properties. In 
identifying the self as the substratum of properties like cognition, 
desire, pleasure, pain, etc., the self is already objectified inasmuch 
as its existence is characterized in terms of these psychological 
predicates. Even though the individual self is said to be 
substratum of these psychological states, it is still an object 
(padārtha) whose reality is defined in terms of these properties.  
The Buddhist contention of such a view of the self is in terms 
of replacing the self-talk by talk about psychophysical properties 
alone, or at best the five aggregates (pañcaskandhas). The alleged 
eternal substance is dropped out of the picture. What we call a 
person is actually seen to be a unified individual consisting of the 
psychophysical aggregates, which are in perpetual change. Since 
the psychophysical aggregates are perceived to be a mutually 
supportive function of the psychological and equally subtle 
physical states, which is beyond the level of ordinary awareness, 
it is natural for us to superimpose a unified personality upon the 
                                               
28Bhattacharyya’s remark in this regard is worth quoting: "The 
metaphysical controversy about the reality of the subject is only about 
the subject viewed in some sense as object" (Studies, 386). 
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aggregates. However, this reification remains at the level of 
language, which, according to Buddhism, pragmatically useful 
though, always tells a lie about the reality. One may however 
wonder how a deceptive device enables us to pick out the 
referents from the plural reality. 
It may be useful to retrieve what a person recalls, according to 
Buddhism, of his or her past existences when he or she achieves a 
certain level of spirituality. The following excerpt is noteworthy:  
In the past existence I was known by such a name. I was born 
into such a family. I was of such an appearance. I was thus 
nourished. I enjoyed pleasure thus. I suffered pain thus. My 
life-span was such. I died in that existence. I was born in other 
existence. In that (new) existence I was known by such a name. 
I was born into such a family. I was of such an appearance. I 
was thus nourished. I enjoyed pleasure thus. I suffered pain 
thus. My life-span was such. I died in that existence. Then I 
was born in this existence.29 
Obviously, the indexical ‘I’ is performing the role of appropriation 
in this retrospection. However, one may still wonder what could 
be the supporting metaphysical ground for the relation between 
the ‘I’ of the person who is remembering and his or her past lives, 
which is accepted by every system of Indian philosophy except 
Cārvāka. It may be conjectured that the usage of ‘I’, according to 
the Buddhists, finds support from the concept of bhavaṅga-citta, 
the undisturbed subterranean stream of consciousness in one’s 
life. This underlying state of consciousness is in a state of 
passivity precisely because it is undisturbed by any impression, 
inner or outer. When this consciousness is affected by any stimuli, 
the resulting state of consciousness is called vīthi-citta.30 It is 
                                               
29Samdhong Rinpoche, ed., Ten Suttas from Dīgha Nikāya, 
Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica Series No. XII, Sarnath: Central Institute of 
Higher Tibetan Studies, reprint of Burma Piṭaka Association 
Publication, 1984, 19. 
 
30One may see related discussion in Anil K. Tewari, “The Problem 
of Personal Identity in Buddhism,” Journal of Indian Council of 
Philosophical Research, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar. 2007), 93-118. 
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pertinent to mention here three more relevant and typical 
Buddhist concepts: cuti-citta, i.e., the consciousness of the last 
moment of one life; gandhabba-citta, i.e., the stream consciousness 
of the deceased person that enters into the zygote; and paṭisandhi-
citta, i.e., the consciousness of the first moment of the next life. 
Thus, the stream of consciousness flows from life to life in a cycle 
of patisandhi-citta, bhavaṅga-citta, vīthi-citta and cuti-citta.31 In the 
Paṭṭhāna, the relation between the preceding consciousness and 
the succeeding consciousness is called anantara-paccaya. In the 
flow of the conscious stream, every moment of the preceding 
consciousness, which has just ceased, is related to every 
succeeding consciousness, which has immediately arisen. This 
relation prevails throughout the recurrent states of an individual 
life, unless it is eventually stopped by the khandha-parinibbāna, that 
is, the extinction of the five aggregates.32 For all soteriological 
purposes this stream may be called the subtle essence of a person 
that appropriates the gross bodies in different lives.  
4. Conclusion  
The above discussion clearly indicates two broad categories in 
which the perspectives of the non-Buddhist and the Buddhist 
systems of Indian philosophy towards the self can be 
accommodated. The former may be called an essentialist 
perspective and the latter a non-essentialist. Cārvāka is always an 
exception; however it can be accommodated in the non-
essentialist category when it comes to reject the notion of an 
unchanging metaphysical self. But, the metaphysical 
disagreements never take an unwelcome or inhumane turn in 
regard to the interrelationship between the self and the other. It 
can be seen as a point of convergence for common morality in 
Indian philosophy and this ethos seems to be foundational to the 
continuation of Indian society and culture. Both the perspectives 
support the cordiality of relationship between the self and the 
other in their own ways. 
                                               
31Bhikkhu J. Kashyapa, The Abhidhamma Philosophy, Vol. 1, Delhi: 
Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, reprint 1982, 165-166. 
32Kashyapa, The Abhidhamma Philosophy, x-xii. 
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Both believe that freedom from bondage and misery is the 
highest goal of human life and their philosophical quest for self-
understanding and self-realization is therefore continuous with 
the quest for self-liberation. The non-Buddhists are of the belief 
that complete self-liberation consists in the realization of the 
eternal self-substance that lies concealed under the phenomenal 
existence. For them, what actually happens in the phenomenal 
concealment of the true self is the formation of the ego, the 
uncompromisingly individualized I-sense. On this the Buddhist 
position is both similar and dissimilar to them. The similarity is 
there in respect of the uncompromising nature of the 
individualized I-sense being responsible for attachment and 
misery and therefore selective inclusion or exclusion of the other. 
However, it is dissimilar in respect of the metaphysical 
description of the process of self-liberation. There is no eternal 
self-substance, contend the Buddhists, for us ultimately to realize 
through the process of dissolution of the ego. On the contrary, the 
quest for such a metaphysical substance as the definitive 
condition of liberation is destined to end in metaphysical 
delusion. Indeed, a necessary condition for attaining liberation is 
that we understand the futility and misguided search for 
something that is entirely mythical. For the Buddhists, reality has 
no place for anything that is unconditioned and permanent in 
nature. 
Everyone has an intimate and strong feeling of the ‘ego- or I-
sense’ and around this one spins one’s world of hopes, desires 
and aspirations. This I-sense is a fact of our conscious existence 
that is collateral with self-consciousness. The ‘self-feeling’ is 
intimately bound up with our immediate experience of self-
existence. The very feeling of being oneself as eternal substance, 
according to the Buddhists, is the root of ego-formation. Owing to 
this ‘I-sense’, we conceive of ourselves as the centre of the world, 
through which the world is ‘objectively represented’ in terms of 
distinguishable names and forms. We can talk about the diversity 
of the world only by presupposing that there are many similar 
selves perceiving and signifying it. Our relation to the world is 
thus ego-centric, and the world is uniquely centred in each of us. 
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Hence, our view of the world from our respective individual ego-
specific points of view appears to us to be an inexorable fact about 
ourselves that becomes a hurdle for the inculcation of the qualities 
such as tolerance, benevolence, altruism, etc. The metaphysical 
aspiration of transcending human finitude by transforming 
oneself into an ‘eternal and immutable’ self is the proposal of the 
non-Buddhists to overcome this challenge. 
Buddhism is emphatic on the self-defeating nature of the 
metaphysical aspiration for self-perpetuation in the attainment of 
an eternal self. Rather than dissolving the ego, the cultivation of 
this aspiration serves the ego or I-sense in a heightened way. It 
thus becomes a seemingly ego-overcoming process that actually is 
ego-perpetuating in disguise. Indeed, it is the delusion of a 
permanent and immutable self-substance that provides the 
metaphysical base for uncompromising ego-centricity to be 
underpinned. Hence the Buddhist recommendation is that we 
understand our true existential condition as the condition of 
perpetual change and dependence on the causal complex of 
reality. Once this understanding is acquired, the delusory quest 
for the realization of an eternal and substantive self would 
naturally disappear. Thus both the proposals share a common 
goal of ego-transcendence, though the two projects differ in 
respect of the process. What is common to both the metaphysical 
and the pragmatic programs of ego-transcendence is the ambition 
of becoming what is described as a ‘selfless’ person. It is this 
person who could be in harmony with the other. 
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